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Summary 
 
 
The shift from ‘industrial wars’ to the contemporary paradigm of ‘war amongst the 
people’ has had enormous consequences for the theory, concepts and ideas about how 
contemporary wars (complex conflicts) are waged. What is the impact of this paradigm 
shift on the role and influence of intelligence? How relevant are intelligence reports for 
the decision-making processes concerning these complex conflicts?   
 
The purpose of this study is to support the intelligence community in the process of 
making intelligence more relevant for decision-making. It is aimed at creating a better 
understanding of the intelligence needs of complex conflicts, and at identifying 
bottlenecks and potential solutions. 
 
The fist part of this study provides a conceptual framework by discussing relevant 
concepts of intelligence and complex conflicts. In the second part, the bottlenecks and 
potential solutions are identified. This part of the study is conducted by using a single 
case study - the Dutch operation in southern Afghanistan.  
 
This study shows that a culture of ‘secrecy’ and an output-driven process within the 
Dutch intelligence community has a negative effect on the relevance of intelligence for 
decision-making. It further identifies a need for a closer relationship between the 
decision-makers and the intelligence producers, and a more pro-active role for the latter.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Theory regarding “contemporary complex conflicts”, including counter-insurgencies, is 
booming, if the number of books and debates is any indication. There is considerable 
discussion today about “what is new” and “what has changed.” However, there seems to 
be no disagreement about certain trends, like the relation with the media, the importance 
of the role of the local population, and a comprehensive approach or 3D-approach.1 But 
how about intelligence? What is the impact of these trends on the role and influence of 
intelligence? How relevant are intelligence and security agency reports for the decision-
making processes concerning these complex conflicts? These questions are largely 
unanswered. This is probably due to the fact that most studies within the field of 
intelligence are neither focused on the population, nor on a comprehensive approach. 
Most studies are related to counter-terrorism; they have a narrow perspective of security 
issues; or they are focused on an opponent’s intentions and capabilities. Most of these 
studies are based on foreign policy objectives and intelligence structures of the US, and 
only a very limited number of studies are addressing the situation in smaller countries 
like The Netherlands.  
 
In his initial assessment of august 2009 general McChrystal, commander of the NATO 
and U.S. forces in Afghanistan, points out that the war in Afghanistan has reached a 
critical phase.2 According to him, a change in strategy and additional resources is needed 
to retake the initiative from the resurgent Taliban. McChrystal warned that failure to 
gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum within a year “risks an outcome 
where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible”.3 If McChrystal’s assessment is 
right, you could assume that during the last eight years of the conflict some wrong 
decisions have been made. 
 
In the literature a wide variety of definitions about intelligence can be identified. 
However, most definitions have in common that the purpose of intelligence is linked to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  idea	  behind	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  comprehensive	  approach	  is	  that	  success	  will	  never	  be	  achieved	  through	  military	  means	  alone,	  but	  through	  an	  integrated	  approach	  that	  involves	  social,	  economical,	  political	   and	   military	   means.	   And	   3D	   (diplomacy,	   defence,	   development)	   relates	   to	   the	   states	  elements	  of	  power.	  2	  McCrystal	  S.A.,	  “Commander´s	  Initial	  Assessment”,	  HQ	  ISAF,	  Afghanistan,	  30	  august	  2009.	  3	  The	  Washington	  Post,	  2	  October	  2009.	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action of some sort, including policy and decision-making. Hence the question can be 
asked: what role did intelligence play in the decision making on Afghanistan? An 
answer to this question is given by McCrystal himself. According to McCrystal, the 
senior leaders are not getting the right information to support decision-making, and is it 
mainly the media who is driving the issues. He identifies a need to reshape the 
intelligence-process, all the way from the sensors to the political decision makers.4 
 
How does this apply to the Netherlands? Based on discussions with a large number of 
people inside an outside the intelligence community, the assumption can be made that 
with regards to Afghanistan, the Dutch are confronted with the same challenges as the 
US. Also concerning Iraq the intelligence service’s reports seemed to be less relevant for 
policy and decision-making. According to the Committee of Inquiry on Iraq5, the 
nuances of the Dutch intelligence service reports concerning Iraq’s Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) programme were not reflected by the relevant ministers or 
departments. “Ministers and departments extracted those statements from the reports that 
were consistent with the stance already adopted. The government was to a considerable 
extent led by public and other information from the US and the UK”.6 
 
It is very likely that the broadly accepted trends/ideas about contemporary complex 
conflicts, such as a comprehensive approach and a focus on the population will have a 
considerable impact on intelligence concepts. A quick analysis of the conflicts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq - as indicated – suggests that a significant impact is that both 
intelligence producers and consumers seem to have problems with making intelligence 
relevant for policy and decision-making.   
 
Managing this problem of relevance drives two lines of thought. Firstly, there is a need 
to understand the trends of complex conflicts from an intelligence point of view. 
Secondly, the most significant current problems with regards to the relevance of 
intelligence, and possible solutions have to be identified. To contribute to the thinking 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   Flynn,	   “Fixing	   Intell:	   A	   Blueprint	   for	  Making	   Intelligence	  Relevant	   in	   Afghanistan”,	   Center	   for	   a	  New	  American	  Security,	  January	  2010,	  p.	  9.	  5	   The	   Committee	   of	   Inquiry	   on	   Iraq	   (a.k.a.	   Committee	   Davids)	   investigated	   the	   decision-­‐making	  concerning	  the	  Dutch	  support	  for	  the	  Iraq	  war.	  The	  committee	  started	  its	  research	  in	  March	  2009	  and	  presented	  its	  report	  in	  January	  2010.	  6	  Report	  Committee	  of	  Inquiry	  Iraq,	  12	  January	  2010,	  p.	  531.	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on how to make intelligence more relevant, the following research question has been 
developed. 
 
Central research question 
The purpose of this study is to support the intelligence producers in the process of 
making intelligence more relevant for policy and decision-making. It is aimed at 
contributing to the process of creating a better understanding of the intelligence needs of 
complex conflicts, and to identify or develop solutions for the bottlenecks. In other 
words: what is different, what problems do this cause, and what can be done about it? 
These aims lead then to the following central research question of this study: 
 
From a Dutch perspective concerning complex conflicts,  
what makes intelligence relevant for decision-making,  
what bottlenecks can be identified, and what are potential solutions? 
 
This study needs a thorough explanation of three topics, namely complex conflicts, 
intelligence, and relevance. These topics will be described and analyzed in chapter 2 and 
3. 
 
As indicated, it is very likely that the trends of contemporary complex conflicts will 
have a broad impact on intelligence concepts. However, the focus of this study lies on 
relevance of intelligence for policy and decision-making. Relevance can be measured by 
the consumer’s possibility to assimilate and use the product in their decision-making 
process, which requires a constant interaction between producer and consumer.7 Because 
the objective of this study lies in the field of intelligence and not in the field of decision-
making, the study will be conducted from the perspective of the intelligence producers. 
Despite the close relation between the concepts of relevancy and quality, they should not 
become intertwined. On the one hand, an intelligence report can be of high quality 
(valid, reliable, and robust), but still of no use to the decision-making process (giving 
good answers to the wrong questions). On the other hand, a report can be of a bad 
quality, but very relevant (giving bad answers to the right questions).8All aspects of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Sims,	  1995,	  p.	  5.	  8	  A	  good	  example	  of	  this	  are	  the	  US	  intelligence	  reports	  concerning	  Iraq´s	  WMD-­‐programme.	  These	  reports	  were	  very	  policy-­‐relevant,	  but	  the	  assessments	  were	  of	  poor	  quality.	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intelligence, which are related to the concept of quality, are outside the scope of this 
study. 
 
Research methodology 
The first aspect of the central research question is to create an understanding of the 
trends of complex conflicts and their possible impacts on intelligence concepts. To 
create such an understanding, first, a conceptual framework for the study is needed. To 
develop such a framework a literature search of the field of intelligence will be 
conducted. The aim is to identify intelligence concepts and ideas, which are relevant to 
the purpose of this study. Thereafter, the essential characteristics of complex conflicts 
will be described. The description of these characteristics will be based on a search, 
from an intelligence perspective, of some influential literature on the field of complex 
conflicts. The aim is to identify those characteristics that most probably will have 
significant consequences for the role of intelligence in decision-making processes.  
 
After having described this conceptual framework of intelligence and complex conflicts, 
the next issue is to identify and discuss the most significant bottlenecks, and potential 
solutions. This part of the study will be conducted using a single case study. As this 
study is written within the Dutch context, the role of the Netherlands Defence 
Intelligence and Security Service (NL-DISS) in support of the Dutch operation in the 
province of Uruzgan, Afghanistan, is chosen for this research.9  
  As this study attempts to identify factors concerning the relevance of 
intelligence for policy and decision-making, this part of the study will be exploratory of 
nature. As there will be many variables involved, with only a single case, the factors 
cannot be identified through statistical manipulation. Instead, analytical generalizations 
will be used. Therefore, not only causal explanations based on the findings of the case 
will be used, but also of hypothetical expectations from the study from the literature on 
complex conflicts and intelligence. To identify more precisely the factors that are of 
influence to the relevancy of intelligence, hypotheses are developed throughout the first 
two chapters of this study. These hypotheses are focused issues of which there is 
insufficient information in the literature, or of which there are dissimilar opinions.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  At	  national/strategic	  level,	  there	  are	  two	  agencies:	  the	  AIVD	  (General	  Intelligence	  and	  Security	  Service)	  and	  the	  MIVD	  (Military	  Intelligence	  and	  Security	  Service)(NL-­‐DISS).	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Sources 
For the case study – to serve its different objectives – a wide variety of sources are 
consulted. Interviews are held with both intelligence producers (analysts and managers 
of the NL-DISS) and intelligence consumers (staff members at the military strategic and 
operational level).10 Use is made of different types of archives (policy documents and 
intelligence reports), open sources, and literature from the fields of intelligence and 
complex conflicts (from both scientists and practitioners). 
Regarding the literature on intelligence, Michael Herman´s famous works 
Intelligence power in peace and war (1996), and Intelligence services in the information 
age (2002),  will provide background data and references to intelligence in general. This 
basis formed on Herman’s work will be complemented by articles published by 
intelligence practitioners, and military doctrine publications.11 Regarding the 
understanding of the distinctive characteristics of complex conflicts, the 
theories/concepts of Christopher Coker, War in an Age of Risk (2009), Rupert Smith, 
Utility of Force – The Art of War in the Modern World (2005), and the JP 3-2412 will 
play a central role in this study. 
  
This study will not give an overall picture of the state of affairs of the Dutch 
intelligence, which is beyond the purpose of this study. The aim is not a descriptive 
generalization of the relevancy of NL-DISS-reports. As noted before, the aim is to 
identify, through analysis, bottlenecks and potential solutions. Knowledge of this will be 
very useful, if we want to improve the relevancy of intelligence products, and thereby 
improving the quality of policy and decision-making. 
 
Composition of the study 
To answer the central research question, this study is composed of three components - 
conceptual, descriptive and analytical. In the first section, the concepts of intelligence 
and complex conflicts are discussed to provide a conceptual framework. In the second 
section, the case is presented. In the third section, the bottlenecks and potential solutions 
are discussed and recommendations are presented. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Because	  of	  legal	  restrictions	  the	  interviewed	  persons	  from	  NL-­‐DISS	  are	  not	  mentioned	  by	  name.	  These	  interview	  objects	  will	  be	  referenced	  as	  ‘Confidential	  interviews	  by	  the	  author,	  on	  date….’.	  	  11	  NATO,	  Doctrine	  AJP-­‐2.1;	  Dutch	  Military	  guidelines	  on	  intelligence	  in	  Leidraad	  5	  (LD	  5).	  12	  US,	  Joint	  Publication	  3-­‐24,	  Counterinsurgency	  Operations,	  (2009).	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The first section of the study is represented in chapter 2 and 3. In chapter 2, an 
introduction to intelligence is presented. It outlines the main characteristics of 
intelligence and describes, and provides an overview of the field. The focus will be on 
aspects that are relevant to the relevance of intelligence – such as the dialogue between 
producers and consumers. In chapter 3 these characteristics of complex conflicts are 
described, which most probably will have a significant impact on the discussed 
intelligence concepts. Attention is paid to hypotheses that are developed to identify more 
focused the bottlenecks. 
 
In the second section – chapter 4 - the case (the Dutch perspective) is presented. It 
describes the context, the strategy, intelligence support, and achievements and 
challenges of the Dutch operation in the Uruzgan province.  
 
The third section deals with the analytical issue of factors of influence on the relevancy 
of intelligence. In chapter 5, the biases and pitfalls are identified and analyzed. In 
chapter 6, the possible solutions are identified and discussed. Finally, recommendations 
bring this study to conclusion. 
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2 Intelligence: Concept, process, context, and factors of influence 
 
What do we mean by intelligence? What processes are used and how does it relate to its 
(policy and decision-making) context? What makes intelligence relevant? Insights into 
these aspects of intelligence are needed to understand the factors that influence the 
relevance of intelligence.  
 
First of all, a definition of intelligence is discussed? (2.1). After positioning the concept 
of intelligence, some basic insights are given into the process that leads to the production 
of intelligence reports (2.2), focussing on the intelligence cycle and its limitations. This 
introduction of concept and process is followed by setting intelligence in its policy and 
decision-making context (2.3). Attention is paid to the interaction between producers 
and consumers, and the place of intelligence in the decision-making process. This 
introductory chapter is concluded by presenting factors that influence the relevance of 
intelligence (2.4). 
 
2.1 Concept 
What do we mean with intelligence? How does it differ from mere information? Even in 
the Dutch vocabulary there are no words that make this distinction. The following 
section discusses the definition of intelligence. 
 
There is certainly no lack of definitions of intelligence. The definition can be used to 
describe a product, or to describe a process, or both. Some definitions include the 
element of secrecy, and others are focussing on the purpose of intelligence. These 
different points of views are reflected in the following definitions. NATO defines it as 
“the product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nations, 
hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential 
operations.”13 Michael Warner defines it as “secret, state activity to understand or 
influence foreign entities.”14 Robert Bowie simply defines it as “information designed 
for action.”15 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  NATO	  AAP-­‐6,	  “Glossary	  of	  Terms	  and	  Definitions”,	  2010,	  p.	  2-­‐1-­‐6.	  14	  Andrew,	  2009,	  p.	  9	  15	  Sims,	  1995,	  p.4	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However, as this study focuses on the relevance of intelligence for policy and 
decision-making, the definition should describe process and product, as well as the 
purpose of intelligence. However, NATO’s and Warner’s definitions are too narrowly 
focused on the product or process. Although Bowie’s definition highlights an essential 
element of intelligence –purposefulness- it is way too broad and does not distinguish 
intelligence from other forms of information “designed for action.” Therefore, none of 
the described definitions are suited for the purpose of this study, and merging them into 
one single definition is difficult.  
 
Intelligence is best defined as information collected, processed, and/or analyzed on 
behalf of actors or decision makers.16 However, to fit the context of this study – national 
intelligence, relevance, complex conflicts - a few remarks about this definition have to 
be made. If the information is collected, processed, or analysed on behalf of national 
consumers, it is often called national intelligence. These consumers can be anyone from 
the minister-president to a platoon-commander in Afghanistan. However, for 
information, to be intelligence, it must be collected, processed, and/or analyzed “on 
behalf of” these actors or decision maker. The “and/or” is essential in the definition, and 
explains that relevant knowledge can be pulled by the consumer or pushed by the 
producer. In most cases the information is collected, processed, and analyzed for the 
consumer (pull). However, if the information is relevant but not collected for the 
consumer, then it must be processed or analyzed for him (push).17 
In the Dutch context the national intelligence concerning complex conflicts is the 
responsibility of the NL-DISS. Secrecy has always been an important component for 
agencies like the NL-DISS. Even though open sources form the majority of information, 
clandestine sources (technical means, human agents) still play an essential role. Secrecy 
relates to the need to protect sensitive information, sources, and methods. So it is well 
known and accepted that secrecy is a significant, but not exclusive, factor within 
intelligence agencies, and therefore it is not needed to include secrecy within the 
definition.18 The essence of purposefulness and the secret part of intelligence is well 
described by Sir David Omand: “intelligence enables action to be optimized by reducing 
ignorance; and secret intelligence achieves this objective in respect of information that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Valk,	  2005,	  p.	  8	  17	  Sims,	  1995,	  p.	  5	  18	  This	  is	  not	  only	  within	  intelligence	  agencies,	  but	  in	  general	  with	  all	  intelligence	  that	  is	  exclusively	  collected	  for	  a	  customer.	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others wish to remain hidden. Thus stated, the purpose of intelligence is not linked 
simply to knowledge for its own sake but to organized and analyzed information that can 
be put to use.19 A last remark is about the context of complex conflicts. Because of this 
context it is an open door that most intelligence concerns foreign entities. For this 
reasons “foreign entities” is not included in the chosen definition.  
 
2.2 Intelligence process 
What do intelligence processes look like? What is the intelligence cycle? This study 
focuses on the relevance of intelligence reports, which is the output of an intelligence 
process. As stated in the definition, intelligence reports are the result of collecting, 
processing and analyzing information. In other words, the process by which information 
is converted into intelligence and made available to consumers. To describe this process, 
different models are used. The model that is most referred to in the literature on 
intelligence is the intelligence cycle.20 The intelligence cycle is the fundamental model 
for thinking about intelligence and constructing intelligence systems. Its objective is to 
provide a sound intelligence process that assists producers as well as consumers in 
understanding their role in the process. 
 
Military intelligence cycle 
The intelligence cycle is described in many ways. Here, the focus lies on the military 
intelligence cycle. The military intelligence cycle is the sequence of activities whereby 
information is obtained, assembled, converted from information into intelligence and 
made available to the consumers. This sequence consists of 4 phases.21  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  This	  description	  of	  intelligence	  was	  presented	  by	  Sir	  David	  Omand	  at	  the	  Professional	  Advanced	  Intelligence	  Course	  at	  FHS,	  Oslo,	  September	  2009.	  20	  Other	  models	  which	  are	  often	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  intelligence	  literature	  are	  the	  intelligence	  matrix,	  and	  the	  warning	  cycle.	  These	  models	  are	  described	  in	  Valk,	  2005,	  p.	  14-­‐18.	  21	  NATO, Doctrine AJP-2.1; Dutch Military Guidelines on Intelligence in Leidraad 5 (LD 5).	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Model 2.1  The military intelligence cycle 
   
 
Direction – The first phase starts with the determination of the consumer’s information 
requirements, planning the collection effort, issuance of orders and requests to collection 
agencies. The cycle starts again with, when the consumers restate their requirements in 
the light of received intelligence products.22 
  
Collection – The second phase of the process is the exploitation of sources by collection 
agencies and the delivery of the information obtained to the appropriate processing unit 
for use in the production of intelligence.  
  
Processing – The third phase is about processing. This concerns the conversion of 
information into intelligence through collation, evaluation, analysis, integration and 
interpretation.  
  
Dissemination – This is the fourth and the last phase of the intelligence cycle. This is the  
timely conveyance of intelligence to the consumers. This phase also concerns the 
reception and feedback of the policy or decision-makers.  
 
As noted, the intelligence cycle exists in many other variants with for example five, six 
or even more phases.23 However, these additional phases are nothing more than an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Herman,	  1996,	  p.	  285.	  23	  For	  example	  the	  intelligence	  cycle	  used	  by	  the	  US.	  This	  model	  consists	  of	  six	  phases:	  planning	  and	  direction,	   collection,	   processing	   and	   exploitation,	   analysis	   and	   production,	   dissemination	   and	  integration,	  and	  evaluation	  and	  feedback;	  
Direction	  
Collection	  
Processing	  
Dissemination	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aspect of some phases of the military intelligence cycle, and do not describe different 
activities. For example, the processing-phase can be spilt in three separate phases: 
processing, analysis and reporting.24  
It is arguable which model describes the intelligence process best. For example, 
an argument to list analysis as a separate phase is that analysis on its own is such a 
crucial element of the process that it should have its own status in the cycle as to 
emphasize its importance. However, the different models are “just modifications”, and 
in the context of this study the majority of stakeholders are familiar with the military 
intelligence cycle. Hence, for the purpose of this study, the military intelligence cycle is 
most suited. This model will also be used as a tool in chapter 5 and 6 to identify and 
analyze the bottlenecks and solution directions.  
 
Limitations 
The intelligence cycle is nowadays a questionable concept. It is often seen as model 
based on WWII and the Cold War. Wilhelm Agrell argues that the cycle can be useful as 
a tool at tactical and operational level to handle mass data, but that the model is 
absolutely not suited as tool for creative problem solving, and, moreover, prevents an 
intelligence system from thinking.25 This aspect of creativity, as will be discussed in the 
next chapter, is in fact an important requisition in dealing with complex conflicts.  
 It is correct that the intelligence cycle has its roots in the period of the Cold War 
in which intelligence had to deal with major crises, or routine reviews.26 In this period, 
in which relative long decision-cycles existed, a clear sequence of the different phases 
did result in relevant intelligence products. However, in the contemporary period of 
complex conflicts, the decision-cycles have shortened dramatically. A clear sequence of 
intelligence activities will not lead to relevant intelligence for the decision-making 
processes. To be useful in complex conflicts a flexible interpretation of the model is 
needed. Hence, nowadays in practice, steps are omitted, and there are side loops and 
feedback moments in between every step of the cycle. To cope with these aspects Sir 
David Omand speaks of the “new intelligence cycle” (model 2.2) which incorporates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/i/4856.html	  24	  Valk,	  2005,	  p.	  13.	  25	  Wilhelm	  Agrell,	  University	  of	  Lund,	  discussed	  this	  in	  a	  RAND	  workshop	  about	  intelligence	  theory,	  15	  June	  2005;	  www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF219/	  	  	  	  26	  Andrew,	  2009,	  p.	  21.	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these many cross-cutting connections.27  
 
Model 2.2 The new intelligence cycle 
 
 
Despite the limitations, the military intelligence cycle, if used in a flexible way/manner, 
remains an appropriate tool for the understanding of intelligence.28 The most important 
prerequisite is the functioning of the feedback mechanism that is supposed to be 
embedded within the existing framework of the cycle. As discussed, the feedback 
mechanism is needed between the different elements on the producer side (for example 
between analysts and collectors), but more importantly between the producers and 
consumers. The following section focuses on this relation between producers and 
consumers.  
 
2.3 Intelligence context 
As noted, the relationship between producers and consumers is crucial.29A functioning 
intelligence process depends on both the producers and the consumers. Insight and 
understanding into each other’s world is hereby a prerequisite. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  This	  model	  was	  presented	  by	  Sir	  David	  Omand	  at	  the	  Professional	  Advanced	  Intelligence	  Course	  at	  FHS,	  Oslo,	  September	  2009.	  This	  model	  has	  one	  extra	  phase:	  Action-­‐on,	  which	  is	  the	  application	  of	   the	   intelligence	   to	   appropriate	  missions,	   tasks,	   and	   functions.	  Accessing	   and	  Elucidating	  are	   in	  principle	  other	  terms	  for	  Collection	  and	  Processing.	  The	  most	  important	  element	  of	  this	  model	  is	  the	  central	  place	  of	  User	  interaction.	  	  	  	  28	  A	  good	  explanation	  of	  the	  intelligence	  cycle	  from	  another	  perspective	  is	  provided	  by	  Michael	  Herman,	  Intelligence	  Power	  in	  Peace	  and	  War,	  p.	  36-­‐57.	  29	  In	  the	  intelligence	  literature	  the	  interaction	  between	  producers	  and	  consumers	  is	  often	  described	  as	  the	  intelligence	  dialogue.	  
Action-­‐on	  
User	  interaction	  
Directing	  
Accessing	  Elucidating	  
Disseminating	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2.3.1 Intelligence dialogue 
As Sir David Omand pointed out “intelligence enables action to be optimized by 
reducing ignorance” and “the purpose of intelligence is not linked simply to knowledge 
for its own sake but to organized and analyzed information that can be put to use.” In 
other words: the purpose of intelligence is to provide politicians and commanders with 
relevant knowledge so they can take better decisions. To make intelligence relevant it 
must be tailored to the consumer’s needs. How does this process of making intelligence 
relevant works?  
 
Reviewing the ‘old’ intelligence cycle, it is the policy and decision makers who, in the 
first phase (direction), are initiating the process by requesting intelligence products that 
addresses the issues they are dealing with (and later restate their requirements in the 
light of received intelligence products). The consumers are the driving force of the 
process, constantly adapting their requirements to optimize their intelligence 
inputs.30But this is not how any knowledge-based system works.31 Often the consumer’s 
requirements are incomplete or unreliable: they simply do not know what they should 
ask. Henry Kissinger recognized this dilemma, he stated that he did not know what 
intelligence he needed but recognized it when he saw it.32 For this reason Michael 
Herman concludes that not the consumers but the producers should be the driving force. 
Rather than simply responding to the consumer’s requirements, they should actively 
seek for the consumer’s needs. As explained in section 2.2, feedback plays a here a 
crucial role. The consumers will know if a report interests them or wastes their time, and 
therefore will have reactions (positive and negative). The producers should seek for 
these reactions and optimize them.33 This approach leads to an adjusted intelligence 
cycle, with intelligence as the controlling element and user reaction as its primary input. 
Herman speaks of the ‘real intelligence cycle’ in which the ‘push’ has to be emphasized, 
together with the importance of feedback, rather than ‘pulls’ (model 2.3).34  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Herman,	  1996,	  p.	  293	  31	  An	  explanation	  about	  knowledge-­‐based	  theory	  is	  provided	  in	  Jaap	  Boonstra	  (ed.)(2004),	  
Dynamics	  of	  Organizational	  Change	  and	  Learning,	  p.	  429-­‐445.	  32	  Herman,	  1996,	  p.	  293.	  33	  Ibid,	  p.	  294.	  34	  Ibid,	  p.	  295.	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Model 2.3 The real intelligence cycle 
 
 
In practice, the main driving force is dependent on the issue at play. If the issue is a 
major crisis or a routine review, such as Iraqi WMD, the policy or decision-makers will 
be leading. If the issue involves large-scale intelligence production, for instance, 
intelligence concerning the current operation in Afghanistan, it is the producers who are 
the critical factor. Whoever is the main driving force, the process has to be collaborative 
and not unidirectional. The effects of this line of thought on the value of intelligence will 
be further discussed in the next paragraph (2.4 Conditions for relevant intelligence).  
 
2.3.2 Decision-making process 
Although decision-making itself is out of scope for this study, it is an important 
prerequisite for making intelligence relevant to producers to have insight and 
understanding into some crucial aspects of this process.  
 
In the literature on intelligence consensus exists about the producer’s role to manage and 
evaluate the process, but not to assess its significance for policy options or considered 
actions. Even though producers may, because of their extensive knowledge of the issue, 
be able to offer options for policy or action, yet it is the policy and decision-makers, who 
need to conduct the assessment.35 To describe these responsibilities the Director NL-
DISS, general-major Cobelens, often used the metaphor of weather forecasting: “… our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Sims,	  1995,	  p.	  14.	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job is to predict whether it is going to rain tomorrow, but it is the decision-makers who 
have to assess whether to wear a rain-jacket or to use an umbrella”.36 Whether this 
principle is still valid in complex conflicts will be discussed in chapter 5.  
Within the intelligence community, it is accepted for policy or decision-makers 
to ignore advices of intelligence because of additional considerations. They can make 
the decision to neither wear a rain-jacket, nor use an umbrella. It is the responsibility of 
decision makers to evaluate all considerations and to set their own priorities.37 These 
considerations can comprise of both policy and operational issues. In the case of the 
Iraqi WMD, the Dutch government decided to politically support the invasion in Iraq 
despite the nuances that the intelligence services presented of Iraq’s capabilities and 
intentions. This decision was mainly based on international political considerations 
(being a reliable ally). On the other hand, the consideration to take no active part in the 
war was based on the majority view of the Dutch public opinion.38  Another important 
consideration often described in the intelligence literature is that of risk-management. 
Risky events are frequently difficult to forecast, since there is only a small chance that 
the event will actually take place.39 However, if the event takes place, the consequences 
are often considerable.40 So in the case of Iraq a hypothetical consideration could have 
been: even though there is only a small chance that Iraq has WMD-capabilities and/or 
has the intention to use them, if it is the case the consequences for the regional security 
are so high that an invasion is still justified. Linking this back to the Dutch decision 
making process this small but high-risk chance supported the political decision to 
support the invasion.  
 
A second aspect is that decision-making processes are seldom tied to specific 
intelligence products. The reality is that consumers are reacting to a wide variety of 
information. The decision-makers frame of mind is not only shaped by intelligence, but 
also by other sources of knowledge such as the media, external and internal advisors, 
and even sources from other countries.41 Intelligence is competing with other sources of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  General-­‐major	  Cobelens	  explained	  this	  principle	  in	  several	  meetings	  in	  which	  the	  author	  anticipated.	  	  	  37	  Gazit,	  “Intelligence	  Estimates	  and	  the	  Decisionmaker”,	  CIA/SII,	  Fall	  1988,	  p.	  32.	  38	  Report	  Committee	  of	  Inquiry	  Iraq,	  12	  January	  2010,	  p.	  529-­‐530.	  39	  Valk,	  2005,	  p.	  69.	  40	  A	  risk	  is	  composed	  of	  chance	  and	  consequences	  (risk	  =	  chance	  x	  consequences).	  41	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Iraq	  the	  Dutch	  government	  was	  to	  a	  considerable	  extent	  led	  by	  public	  and	  other	  information	  from	  the	  US	  and	  the	  UK:	  Report	  Committee	  of	  Inquiry	  Iraq,	  12	  January	  2010,	  p.	  531	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knowledge. In addition, it is important to realize that most intelligence products have 
more long-term effects in shaping the consumer’s frame of mind rather than short-term 
effects on identifiable decisions. It is the constant flow of intelligence and ‘other’ 
knowledge that shape decisions and actions, rather than specific sets of intelligence. This 
way the role of intelligence is educating the decision-makers. The products provide them 
with knowledge that may influence unforeseen future decisions. According to Michael 
Herman intelligence can have the same unpredictable effect as newspapers; a 
background item today turns out to be relevant for decision-making tomorrow or next 
year.42  
 
The described processes can lead to decisions in which the consumers, based on other 
considerations or other sources of knowledge, ignore advice from intelligence. However, 
this can still be considered as a rational process. The reality is that ‘clean’ rational or 
analytical decision-making does not exist in complex situations (including complex 
conflicts). As stated above a decision-maker’s frame of mind can be shaped by 
additional factors besides to the formal information inputs. Herman points out that 
besides information, decisions involve leadership, judgment, political sense, and 
determination.43 This rather irrational process is well described in Herbert Simon’s 
famous model of ‘bounded rationality’.44 Policy and decision-makers may also believe 
that they are objective and rational, but forget their psychological investment they made 
in previous decisions. If they have participated in a decision, they develop a stake in that 
decision. And as they participate in further related decisions, their stake even increases. 
This may lead to a situation where they ignore facts and dangers that stand in 
contradiction to their policy or action.45 Hence, good intelligence ‘is a means of reducing 
government’s recklessness; that encourages leaders to value information, reason and 
argument rather than conviction, emotion and impulse.’46 In the next section is discussed 
what makes intelligence ‘good’ – the requirements on intelligence.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Herman,	  1996,	  p.	  144.	  43	  Ibid,	  p.	  141.	  44	  Simon,	  1959,	  p.93.	  He	  showed	  in	  this	  model	  that	  the	  assumptions	  that	  economic	  rationality	  made	  about	  human	  capacities,	  knowledge	  and	  information-­‐processing	  procedures	  were	  rather	  unreasonable.	  45	  Herman,	  2002,	  p.15.	  	  	  	  	  46	  Quoted	  from	  Herman,	  2002,	  p.21.	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2.4 Factors of influence  
What are the requirements for relevant intelligence? What happens if these requirements 
are not met? In the literature on intelligence, a large number of factors are described that 
influence the value of intelligence.47 Most important are relevance, objectivity, 
acceptance, brevity, being on time, and accessibility.  
 
Relevance & Objectivity 
Relevance is the focus of the central research question. Relevance can be measured by 
the consumer’s ability to assimilate and use the product in its decision-making process48. 
Intelligence should be relevant to decision-making otherwise it remains information. The 
previous sections explained the requirement of a constant interaction between producer 
and consumer for intelligence to be relevant. If the consumers do not get the information 
collected, processed, and/or analyzed on their behalf, or if the consumers fail to provide 
adequate feedback, the intelligence process will break down. Objectivity is needed to 
ensure the quality of intelligence. Where relevance requires a close relation between 
producer and consumer, objectivity demands a certain distance.  
 
There are two models concerning this relationship between consumers and producers. 
These models are presented here as ideal types – the ‘Kent’ and ‘Gates’ models.49 The 
Kent model represents the view that if producers are getting too close to the policy or 
decision-makers, they will lose their objectivity. Producers should only respond to 
specific intelligence requests rather than initiating direct interaction with consumers. 
This means that the consumers are the driving force behind the process. The criticism on 
this model is that producers, because of their strict independence, provide intelligence 
that is not addressing the consumer’s issues. 
The Gates model advocates a closer relationship between producers and 
consumers through the development of a two-way flow of information and feedback.50 
To make intelligence relevant, the producers must be sensitive to the context of the 
policy or action context. The consumers need intelligence that relates to the objective 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  See	  NATO Doctrine AJP-2.1; Dutch Military Guidelines on Intelligence in Leidraad 5 (LD 5); CIA 
Studies in Intelligence.	  48	  Sims,	  1995,	  p.	  5.	  49	  Betts,	  2003,	  p.	  60.	  50	  Valk,	  2005,	  p.	  39.	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they are trying to achieve.51In this model the producers are the driving force. A reproach 
of this model is that the producers become too involved in the decision-making process. 
This may lead to a situation where producers will develop a stake in decisions, ignore 
facts and dangers that stand in contradiction to these decisions, in the same way as the 
policy and decision-makers themselves.52 In the literature on intelligence this process is 
known as ‘politicization’. Jennifer Sims describes politicization as ‘the skewing of 
intelligence to influence policy outcomes or vindicate policy choices.’53 This skewing 
can happen consciously or unconsciously.54 
 
Whatever the view is, the challenge remains to produce intelligence that objectively 
assesses relevant policy or decision issues – regardless of whether it supports or 
undermines these issues.55 Betts is stating that politicization is a fact of intelligence 
producer’s life, which has to be dealt with in the most effective way. The producer’s aim 
should be to strive to minimal political contamination, but zero is not possible without 
placing intelligence out of the political realm.56 Or as Michael Herman puts it: 
”A mixture is therefore needed of intimacy and distance; intelligence needs to 
be a part of governments brain, but with a permeable membrane separating it 
from the decision-taking centre”.57 
 
Acceptance 
Tailoring intelligence to the needs of the consumer is only a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition to make intelligence relevant to policy and decision-making. One of 
the most critical phases in the intelligence cycle is convincing the consumers to make 
best use of the provided intelligence.58 Three aspects play an important role in the 
acceptance of intelligence: the producer’s reputation, a good chemistry between 
producer and consumer, and marketing.59  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Betts,	  2003,	  p.	  61.	  52	  As	  described	  in	  §	  2.3:	  The	  discussion	  about	  decision-­‐making	  and	  ‘bounded	  rationality’.	  53	  Sims,	  1995,	  p.	  6.	  54	  For	  more	  about	  politicization	  see	  Betts,	  2003,	  p.	  59-­‐75.	  55	  Robert	  Gates,	  ¨Guarding	  Against	  Politicization¨.	  CIA/SII,	  1992,	  Vol	  36	  No	  5,	  p.6.	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  2003,	  p.	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  Herman,	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The consumers will be more receptive to intelligence if the producer has a good 
reputation concerning objectivity, accuracy, and quality of assessments. If an 
intelligence product shows to be polluted by the analyst’s own position and perspective, 
not only the product itself will be disregarded, but it will also have negative effects on 
the receptivity of future reports. The same accounts for worst-case assessments. If the 
producer comes too often, because of a “play-it-safe” and bureaucratic attitude, with bad 
news, they will lose at a point in time their credibility.60 
There can be a tension between the ability of cooperation between the producers 
and consumers on the one hand, and the need for objective intelligence on the other. The 
ideal combination would be one of an open-minded policy or decision-maker, who seeks 
the advice of a producer who is sensitive to the context but who has enough courage to 
provide objective intelligence – also when it undermines the policy or action. 
Unfortunately this ideal combination is rare in reality.61 
Producers - with or without enough sensitivity and/or courage - can be 
confronted with dogmatic and stubborn policy and decision-makers who pamper wishful 
thinking. In these situations the producers have to put a lot of effort in persuasion, 
building personal relations and marketing.62 
  According to Robert Gates nothing is wrong with producers conducting some 
marketing to get their reports read. It does not mean ‘sugar-coating’ analysis, but an 
open and unbiased discussion of the issues. Policy and decision-makers may have a 
different perspective of an issue from the producers. This perspective should not be 
rejected, but it should rather address its strengths and weaknesses, and should clarify the 
evidence and reasoning behind it. Acceptance can also be improved if producers meet 
consumers on a regular basis to exchange views and explore new ideas.63 On some 
occasions a physical presentation can be more persuasive and efficient than a written 
report. From a marketing perspective, the routine output of intelligence can be useful. 
Consumers get accustomed to it and this will help building up credibility for the future.64 
Routine output can also be helpful in getting difficult information between the 
consumer’s ears. Similar as in the advertisement world – the strength of the messages 
lies in the repetition. For these reasons, marketing can be a helpful tool in increasing the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	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  Handel,	  “Intelligence	  and	  the	  problem	  of	  Strategic	  Surprise”,	  in	  Betts,	  2003,	  p.	  21.	  61	  Ibid.	  p.	  32	  62	  Herman,	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  p.	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  63	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  Vol	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  No	  5,	  p.7.	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  1996,	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acceptance of intelligence products. However, getting the policy and decision-makers to 
read the intelligence products, should not threaten the producer’s objectivity. Judgments 
should never be modified to make intelligence more acceptable – which at the longer 
term will be counterproductive anyway.65 Other conditions that have an influence on the 
level of acceptance are being on time and brevity. 
 
Timely 
Intelligence has only value if it can be embedded in the decision-making process at the 
right time. This also requires an effective interaction between producers and consumers. 
It is important to realize that there can be a significant difference in the time needed to 
produce intelligence reports, depending on the amount of direct available information 
and collection capabilities. The decision-maker must understand the producer’s time 
limitations to timely forward his intelligence needs. On the other hand, it is for the 
producers essential to know when important decisions are going to be made. This is not 
always clear and the producers must be sensitive to the policy and decision-making 
context. This context also involves the receptiveness of the policy and decision-makers. 
Issues often develop through four phases. In the first phase the produced intelligence is 
part of routine reviews, but is not affecting the decision-makers. In the second phase the 
issue has become relevant, but a decision is not yet needed. In this phase the decision-
makers are most receptive to factual intelligence and to intelligence that helps 
developing policy or possible actions. In the third phase, they have made up their 
position and taken a decision. In this phase the decision-makers are mainly interested in 
intelligence of the effects and implications of their decision. The last phase concerns the 
implementation of the chosen policy or action. The decision-makers have developed a 
stake in their decision and are not receptive to intelligence that question the success of 
the implemented policy or action.66  
 
Brevity 
In the literature on intelligence, is often stated that consumers value intelligence based 
on brevity, timeliness and relevance, and that it’s valued in this order of sequence. The 
value of intelligence has no correlation with the number or size of packages of 
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intelligence products.67 Producers do not always realize this. They should keep in mind 
that the policy and decision-makers are consumers of large amounts of information they 
receive on the issue.68 Richard Clarke pointed out that an information overload is one of 
the most important reasons why intelligence sometimes fails. Too much intelligence can 
cloud the fact that there is not enough relevant intelligence. It also makes it difficult to 
identify the significance of single reports or of pieces of information hidden in lengthy 
reports. According to Clarke this was one of the main reasons why 9/11 could happen: 
‘not able to connect the dots, because there were too many dots on the radar screen.’69  
 
Accessibility 
The last condition discussed in this section is that intelligence should always be 
available to those who need it or it will be of no value at all. The most dominant aspect 
that influences the accessibility of intelligence is that of secrecy. Michael Herman is 
describing secrecy as ‘…intelligence’s trademark: the basis of its relationship with 
government and its own self-image.’70 However, there is a continuous debate about the 
dichotomy openness/secrecy. On the one hand, if intelligence is too unrestricted, the risk 
exists of sensitive information, sources, and methods to be compromised.71 On the other 
hand, if it is too secret, intelligence might not be used in the best and most profitable 
way in policy or decision-making. 72  
However, the discussion is not focused on the protection of the clandestine 
sources and methods, but on the protection – classification – of information and 
intelligence products. In the literature on intelligence, it is argued that the issues and 
aspects that need to be kept secret must be reduced to a minimum.73 As noted, an 
important argument to release reports is that it will improve the usability for policy and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	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  1996,	  p.	  298.	  68	  Valk,	  2005,	  p.	  23.	  69Richard	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decision-making. An aspect that in complex conflicts, with its large number of 
stakeholders, is even more relevant. Another argument to put less emphasize on secrecy 
is the amount of open sources information used by intelligence agencies. According to 
most estimates, about 90 percent of the information used in intelligence analysis today 
comes from open sources.74 Some argue that it is even possible that a small group of 
experts working solely on the basis of open source material provides more relevant 
knowledge than a large inefficient agency that is using classified information.75 
According to former director of the CIA – William E. Colby – another reason to 
advocate openness is the additional knowledge that can be obtained from academic- and 
other experts. Comparable with the scientific method, independent criticism can be 
utilized to improve own assessments.76 
  The issues and aspects to be kept confidential should in each case carefully be 
considered. The aim is to find the right balance between the risks of disclosure and the 
need for usability. However, the reality is that producers seem to have a tendency to err 
in the direction of too much risk aversion and under-utilization of intelligence 
products.77 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter focussed on providing a conceptual framework for the other components of 
this study. By providing an overview and insights in the aspects of intelligence that are 
related to the concept of relevance, direct links have been made to the central research 
question.  
First, insights in the intelligence concept and process were explored. It provided 
a definition of intelligence - information collected, processed, and/or analyzed on behalf 
of actors or decision makers. It showed that, the intelligence cycle, if used in a flexible 
way and with functioning feedback mechanisms, remains an appropriate tool for the 
understanding of intelligence. 
Thereafter is explained how significant the intelligence dialogue is for an 
effective intelligence process. It made clear that is has to be a two-way and not 
unidirectional process, in which both producers and consumers have a distinctive role to 
play. If the issue at play is a major crisis or a routine review the policy or decision-	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makers will be leading. If the issue involves large-scale intelligence production it will be 
the producers who are the main driving force. 
Finally, the most dominant factors of influence were presented which are related 
to the relevance of intelligence – relevance & objectivity, acceptance, brevity, being on 
time, and accessibility. 
 
With this conceptual framework in mind, the next chapter focuses on these distinctive 
characteristics of complex conflicts, which could have an impact on the discussed 
aspects of intelligence. 
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3 Complex conflicts 
 
What do we mean with complex conflicts? What are its distinctive characteristics? 
Contemporary armed conflicts occur in the context of an evolving strategic 
environment.78 The key drivers of this changing environment are: globalization, 
interdependency, demographic and environmental change, and the impact of 
technology.79 In recent years there has been a continuous debate on the shape of future 
warfare and the utility of force in this increasingly dynamic and complex environment. 
‘Fourth generation warfare’, ‘irregular warfare’ and ‘low intensity conflicts’ are a few of 
the ‘big ideas’ or ‘grand narratives’ in contemporary strategic discourse. In addition, 
some scholars speculate about ‘new wars’ opposed to ‘old wars’. 80 These terms are 
often fashionable intellectual labels but ones that, when placed under the microscope, 
are not always watertight. 
As Clausewitz explained ‘all wars are things of the same nature’81. The factors 
friction, uncertainty and chaos, danger and stress together with the trinity of ‘violence, 
enmity, and hatred’, ‘chance and probability’, and ‘reason’82, will always be present. 
Hence, there are no new types of armed conflicts obedient to some distinctive nature of 
their own. While the nature of war is unchanging, there are differences in the way wars 
are waged - warfare. Just like other social processes warfare is - as a consequence of 
both internal and external factors - constantly developing. Many books and articles have 
been written about these changes or transformations. Martin van Creveld spoke about a 
‘transformation of war’ and predicted the replacement of large-scale, interstate wars by 
‘low intensity wars’.83 Rupert Smith describes in The Utility of Force the contemporary 
paradigm of ‘War Amongst the People’ as a synthesis between industrial wars and the 
classical revolutionary wars.84 
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  of	   ‘war’	  can	  have	  different	  meanings	  depending	  on	  the	  context	  and	  who	  is	  using	  it.	  What	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   war	   in	   a	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   sense	   and	   what	   is	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   understood	   by	   the	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   do	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  coincide.	  Today	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  p.	  606.	  82	  War	  subordinate	  as	  means	  to	  politics	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For the purpose of this study, the term ‘complex conflicts’ is not used as a theory or one 
of the ‘big ideas’ about new wars or a new generation warfare. Complex conflicts can be 
seen as an umbrella concept for the description of the characteristics of the armed 
conflicts as they occurred at the end of twentieth and beginning of twenty-first century. 
The concept is used to describe the context, and the applied means and methods on both 
sides – Rupert Smit’s paradigm. 
 
Nothing new? 
In the debates about contemporary conflicts the bandwagon is often counter-insurgency 
(COIN). Despite all the discussions, there is a wide acceptance of the following 
principles: there is no military solution to an insurgency, only a political one; the 
necessity of an integrated and coordinated strategy; and a focus on the population.85 But, 
as Colin Gray points out, COIN is an old story, and so are the methods applied to wage 
it, on both sides. In recent years, the defence and security community has in fact 
rediscovered what in the UK was called ‘grand strategy’ – in the US, ‘national security 
strategy’ - to be a good idea.86 Not all characteristics of Rupert Smit’s paradigm are new.  
 
Is it only about COIN? 
Within NATO, COIN is one of the four so called predominant campaign themes - major 
combat, COIN, peace support, and peacetime military engagement. The themes are 
determined at the political-strategic level and are used to identify the character of a 
campaign. The different themes can be discriminated by four criteria: level of acceptable 
risk, strategic end-state, character of combat, and type of adversary.87 
COIN is nowadays also seen a political correct umbrella concept in which all 
characteristics of contemporary armed conflicts are integrated. However, most of the 
terms and concepts related to COIN - hearts & minds campaign, reconstruction, 
asymmetric threats, comprehensive approach, role of the media, non-state actors etc. - 
are also applicable to the other campaign themes. Hence, Rupert Smit’s paradigm is not 
only about COIN. 	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Is it about all types of warfare? 
In Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, two types of 
warfare are discussed – the traditional large scale warfare between states, and irregular 
warfare. The important distinction between these is the focus. In traditional warfare the 
conflict focuses on the control of an adversary’s forces or territory, whereas in irregular 
warfare, the conflict focuses on the control or influence over, and the support of the 
population.88 It is this focus on the population what makes the concept of irregular 
warfare to provide a better understanding of complex conflicts. Clausewitz tells us that 
every era or period fights wars in its own way, which is why every era of armed 
conflicts has its own defining characteristics. It is what Clausewitz calls the cultural 
‘grammar’ of irregular warfare that describes the best way in which the West thinks 
about contemporary armed conflicts.   
 
3.1 Conventional wisdom 
After this first positioning of what complex conflicts are about, this section provides an 
overview of the most relevant characteristics. Despite all the debates and discussions, 
nowadays there also exists a sort of conventional wisdom about the most dominant 
characteristics of complex conflicts. The following characteristics will most probably 
have an impact on the discussed intelligence concepts: changing ends, integrated 
approach, cultural understanding, local grievances, population-centric, adapting 
competition, fragile states, media, and intelligence rules.  
 
Changing Ends - In traditional warfare the political objective was attained by the 
achievement of a strategic military objective. The conflicts had clear-cut strategic goals 
and were focused on defeating the opposing force through engagements on the 
battlefield, and influencing the government by taking control of their territory. These 
‘hard’ strategic objectives were often expresses in terms like ‘take’, ‘hold’, and ‘ 
destroy’. The achievements on the battlefield decided the political outcome. In complex 
conflicts, however, the military objective is to establish a condition in which the political 
objective can be achieved by other means. These ‘softer’ military objectives are more 
complex and sub-strategic. The focus is on the control or influence over, and the support 	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of the population and not on the control of adversarial forces or territory – ‘the will of 
the people’. The military achievements create time and space for diplomacy, economic, 
and social incentives to create the desired political outcome. ‘If a decisive strategic 
victory was the hallmark, of industrial war, establishing a condition may be deemed the 
hallmark of the new paradigm of war amongst the people.’89 
 
Integrated approach – The objective of military forces is ‘limited’ to establishing a 
condition in which the political objective can be achieved by other means. Complex 
conflicts usually stems from political, economic, religious and social grievances, which 
can only be successfully countered by an integrated and coordinated strategy that 
employs all instruments of power – the comprehensive-, whole-of-government-, or 3D-
approach. 90 
 
Cultural understanding – Complex conflicts is above all about the control of or 
influence over, and the support of the population. If we do not know much about their 
beliefs, values, expectations, and behaviour, it is unlikely that we register much 
progress. Even worse, by behaving like strangers in a strange land we do more harm 
than good to the achievement of this objective.  
 
Local - Complex conflicts usually stem from political, economic, religious and social 
grievances. However, the majority of the core grievances are caused by local disputes. 
Addressing these local grievances will help to achieve the objective of winning the will 
of the people. A careful exploitation of local personalities and local conflicts could also 
drive a wedge between the adversary and the population at large.91 On the other hand, if 
this is not done carefully enough, it could strengthen the band between the adversary and 
the population. Hence, a deep understanding of the social relationships, economic and 
other disputes, and power brokers of the local communities is crucial. Another 
significant effect is that the achievements at the local level will create time for 
diplomacy, economic, and social efforts at national level. 
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Population-centric – Complex conflicts is about winning the support of the population - 
the will of the people. According to General McChrystal, “the conflict will be won by 
persuading the population, not by destroying the enemy.”92 As stated, the military 
objective in complex conflicts is ‘limited’ to establishing a condition in which the 
political objective can be achieved by other means. To achieve this objective the 
adversary has to be suppressed to such a level that they cannot effectively interfere with 
the efforts to win the support of the population. However, in complex conflicts the 
adversary will on the one hand have opposite objectives – establishing a condition in 
which our political objectives can ‘not’ be achieved – and the on other hand have the 
same objective of winning the support of the population. He will try to achieve these 
objectives by following a strategy of provocation and propaganda of the deed, and using 
a combination of subversion, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and conventional warfare.93 
For his strategy the people form the battleground, and a requirement for his method is 
sufficient support of the local population. Hence, in complex conflicts the battle is about 
the will of the people.  
 
Adapting competition – In complex conflicts, success depends for an important part on 
our ability to adapt, evolve to new responses, and get ahead of a rapidly changing threat 
environment. As stated conflicts are becoming more protracted. But the longer conflicts 
continue so the more innovative adversaries become. They are more open-sourced and 
decentralized and organized around distributed or quasi- independent groups. 
Adversaries will constantly shift between military and political phases and tactics - what 
works today may not work tomorrow.94 
 
Fragile states - Complex conflicts occur in essence only in states where the 
government’s legitimacy and effectiveness is weak or nonexistent - fragile states. States 
can be assessed as weak or fragile when they are unable or unwilling to provide the 
population with so called ‘deliverables’. These deliverables essentially refer to the 
provision of four public services: physical security, economic management, legitimate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  Flynn,	  “Fixing	  Intell:	  A	  Blueprint	  for	  Making	  Intelligence	  Relevant	  in	  Afghanistan”,	  Center	  for	  a	  New	  American	  Security,	  January	  2010,	  p.	  24.	  93	  Kilcullen,	  2009,	  p.	  12.	  94	  Kilcullen,	  2009,	  p.	  294.	  
	  	  
33	  
political institutions, and social welfare.95 In complex conflict most states have critical 
gaps in all these four areas of governance. Analytical distinctions between failing states 
can be made on the basis of level of legitimacy and capability and capacity to provide 
the deliverables – failed, failing, and recovering state. 96 Patrick Stewart distinguishes in 
a different manner. He identified four categories of fragile states based on distinguishing 
between capacity and will (table 3.1). 97 
 
Table 3.1 Capacity and Will as dimensions of state weakness 
                                         Strong Will                                Low Will 
High Capacity Relative good 
performers 
Unresponsive/corrupt/ 
repressive 
Low Capacity Weak but willing Weak and not willing 
 
 
Media - The media plays a significant role in complex conflicts. The media brings the 
conflict direct in the homes of both leaders and the public. The policy and decision-
maker’s frame of mind is not only shaped by intelligence, but also by what they see and 
read in the media, and by their understanding of the public opinion.98 As Clausewitz 
explained, every government and military must maintain the support of their people. 
Therefore, the public opinion can have more influence on decisions than the events in 
the area of operations. Another reason why the media play such a crucial role is related 
to the political objective in complex conflicts – the will of the people. The public 
opinion of the local population will influence the achievement of this objective. And 
depending on the accessibility, the media can have a substantial effect on the public 
opinion. According to Rupert Smith, the media has become the medium that connects 
the three sides of the Clausewitz’s triangle – domestic and local.99 
 
Intelligence rules – As General McChrystal stated, “the conflict will be won by 
persuading the population, not by destroying the enemy”. This statement should be 	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reflected on intelligence efforts. Intelligence should be focussed on identifying the social 
relationships, economic and other disputes, and power brokers - at local, regional, and 
national level. This knowledge is crucial for the exploitation of the core grievances and 
the elimination of the root causes of the conflict. By doing this the support of part of the 
population can be won. Efforts to achieve this objective without accurate intelligence 
may alienate the population and drive them towards the adversary. Support of the local 
population is also crucial for efforts to suppress an adversary. Local people are in 
general far better than outsiders at finding the rather formless adversaries. The local 
character has a considerable impact on the intelligence process. The most relevant 
intelligence in complex conflicts will come from the bottom up, not from the top 
down.100 The intelligence process will include actors – consumers and suppliers of 
information – not traditionally associated with military operations, such as other 
governmental actors, willing NGOs, economic structures/ local businesses and local 
security forces.101 Hence, a prerequisite for complex conflicts is a ‘comprehensive 
intelligence approach’. 
 
The essence of this overview of the dominant characteristics of complex conflicts is 
captured by David Kilcullen when he describes the ‘counterwar theory’ of the French 
brigadier-general Francart.   
 
“In the twenty-first century, ground forces would mainly be required to 
intervene in extremely complex conditions of state failure and in humanitarian 
or peacekeeping environment, where law and order were compromised and 
state institutional frameworks were lacking. Such forces would have to uphold 
the law of armed conflict in the face of adversaries who ignored it, and Western 
countries would be seeking to control or end violence rather than, as in 
traditional warfare, to achieve policy ends through violence. This approach 
could be considered a ‘counterwar strategy’, where the key threat to be 
mastered would be the conflict environment itself, rather than a particular 
enemy.”102  
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3.2 Other insights 
After this ‘conventional wisdom’ about complex conflicts, this section provides some 
further insights. In the literature about complex conflicts dozens of other theories, 
concepts, or ideas, can be found describing additional characteristics. Because of the 
relevance to the central research question the focus of this section will be on the 
concepts of ‘risk management’ and ‘wicked problems’ of Christopher Coker and the 
concept of ‘the political economy of war and peace’ of Mats Berdal. 
 
Risk management and wicked problems 
 
Risk management 
In his book, War in Age of Risk, describes Christopher Coker how we find ourselves 
living in risk societies, a term popularized by, among others, the German sociologist 
Ulrich Beck.103 Risk society is a term to describe the manner in which modern society 
organizes itself in response to risk. According to Beck, a risk society is increasingly 
preoccupied with the present (and also with security), which generates a notion of risk. 
Beck defines it as a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and 
introduced by modernization itself.104 A consequence of living in today’s risk society is 
that we are concerned with the risk management of everything. Risk has not only 
become the language of business, politics and public policy, but it has also become the 
language of war – war in age of risk.105 Whereas in the past, war has been seen as a 
battle of wills, Cristopher Coker is arguing that war has evolved into an exercise in risk 
management. If a concern about defence and threats were defining characteristics, of 
industrial war, a concern with security and risks are the defining characteristic of Rupert 
Smith’s paradigm of war amongst the people (table 3.2).106 This concern about security 
and risks has caused the political ambitions are much more modest now than they have 
been for some time. Given the endless risks, a New World Order is no longer seen as a 
realistic goal. 107 In the words of Condoleeza Rice: “We strive to make our world 
ultimately safer. Not perfect, just better.”108 However, an objectively secure world does 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  Coker,	  2009,	  p.	  63.	  104	  Ulrich	  Beck	  (1992),	  Risk	  Society:	  Towards	  a	  New	  Modernity,	  Cambridge:	  Polity,	  p.21.	  105	  Coker,	  2009,	  p.	  26.	  106	  Ibid,	  p.	  63.	  107	  Ibid,	  p.	  132.	  108	  Washington	  Post,	  26	  july	  2007.	  
	  	  
36	  
not exist. Whether we feel secure or not is a matter of perception. Our social experience 
gives us the feeling that we are at risk most of the time from terrorists, transnational 
organized crime, as well as global pandemics. According to Coker, we find ourselves 
living in a world in which anxiety has become part of everyday.109 
 
Table 3.2 The transition to the risk age 
Industrial war War amongst the people 
War as Defence War as Security 
Threats Risks 
Fear Anxiety / individual safety 
New World Order Global disorder 
 
As stated, a consequence of living in today’s risk society is that we are concerned about 
the management of all possible risks. However, what makes risk management 
problematic is that the world has become incredibly complex, dynamic, and 
interconnected– everything has consequences. Many of the risks we try to manage are 
associated with the unintended consequences of our own actions – consequence 
management. These often arise from the fact that everything we do usually has side-
effects.110 Besides that, many actions have long-term effects, which do not always 
become clear until it is too late. It is this uncertainty about the outcomes from our own 
actions that makes us more concerned about the management of short-term risks, than 
dealing with long-term threats - “a frantic wish to secure today rather than 
tomorrow”.111This uncertainty also causes us to interrogate ourselves more intensively 
than ever. We have become hopelessly self-reflexive and as a result increasingly risk-
averse.112 
 
As Rupert Smith pointed out, ‘If a decisive strategic victory was the hallmark, of 
industrial war, establishing a condition may be deemed the hallmark of the new 
paradigm.’113 The aim of any military intervention must be to establish certain 
conditions on the ground from which political outcomes can be decided. Hence, in an 	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age of risk victory is no longer possible and it is more useful to talk about success. 
Success can be defined as reducing insecurity to more acceptable levels – risk 
management. However, there is a constant debate about how to define the concept of 
success. Amongst others, David Kilcullen is arguing that ‘measuring progress’ is the 
best way to assess whether a campaign is on track – is successful - or not. The next 
challenge is how to measure progress because “organizations manage what they 
measure, and they measure what their leaders tell them to report on.” 114 This requires a 
new operational culture. The focus on the achievement of total objectives seems to be 
irrelevant; risk management requires a different framework of analysis in which 
intelligence has an important role to play.115 
 
Wicked Problems 
Closely related to ‘risk management’ is the concept of ‘wicked problems’.116 Rittel and 
Webber described this concept of "wicked" problems in contrast to relatively "tame," 
solvable problems. Complex conflicts bear many of the characteristics of wicked 
problems.117 
 
Difficult to define - Nobody can define wicked problems. Defining the problem and the 
solution is essentially the same task. Each attempt at creating a solution and its 
unforeseen consequences changes your understanding of the problem. As the situation 
evolves, the definition of the problem will also change.118 
 
You are part of the problem - Every implemented solution to a wicked problem has 
consequences. However, in our complex, dynamic and interdependent world cause and 
effect is increasingly non-linear. Solutions to wicked problems generate a chain of 
events and it is impossible to know how this chain of events will eventually play out. 
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Because of these so-called ‘cascading effects’, every objective that is set tends to 
produce an unforeseen range of new problems.119 
  
No best solution - There is no best solution to wicked problems, only better or worse 
developments. The causes of a wicked problem can be explained in numerous ways. 
Many stakeholders often have different aims and perspectives and thus will have various 
and changing ideas about what might be the problem, what might be causing it and how 
to resolve it.120 Because of this disagreement there can be no indisputable best solution. 
Often is the result of this a ‘muddling through approach’. 
 
Can never be solved - Since a wicked problem cannot be defined, it can never be 
resolved. Problems that are ‘wicked’ can only be managed. The most efficient way of 
dealing with wicked problems is to manage the developments in the right direction – 
progress. This requires a more process-orientated than an action-orientated approach. 
You should not think in projects, tasks, and solutions but in management. This is a 
particular challenge for soldiers, who are educated and trained in problem solving. The 
managing process often ends when resources are depleted, stakeholders lose interest, or 
political realities change. In other words: “when a problem ceases to be problematic, the 
problem goes away.”121 
 
The political economy of war and peace.  
The last issue discussed in this chapter is the importance of economic motivations in 
complex conflicts. Clausewitz famously described war as a continuation of politics by 
other means. David Keen has adapted this rule and he concludes that complex conflicts 
can often be better understood as “the continuation of economy by other means”.122  
 
The strategic objective in complex conflicts is winning the will of the people. An 
absolute prerequisite for the achievement of this objective is legitimacy. According to 
Mats Berdal, building legitimacy should be the main focus of the activities of both the 
military and civilian side of the operation. The relative success in winning the will of the 
people depends heavily on the degree of perceived legitimacy of the intervening force 	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itself - a function of its actions, identity, and ability to meet local expectations - and on 
the degree of perceived legitimacy of the administrative and governance structures.123 
To build this legitimacy he identifies three priority tasks -providing a secure 
environment, creating and stabilizing government structures, and ensuring the basic and 
life-sustaining needs of the local population.124As discussed earlier, in complex conflicts 
the short-term stabilization objective is to establish a condition in which the political 
objective – vital to long-term stability - can be achieved. Berdal’s three priority tasks are 
not only crucial for building legitimacy, but also for the achievement of the objective of 
security and political stability in the short term. Hence, legitimacy and the stabilization 
objectives have a dynamic relationship.125 More legitimacy supports the achievement of 
the objectives and the achievement of the objectives supports the building of legitimacy.  
As stated, the exploitation of core grievances and the elimination of root causes 
require a deep understanding of the conflict environment. The same accounts for 
building legitimacy. Trying to achieve these objectives without sufficient knowledge can 
deepen societal divisions, generate more conflict, and may alienate the population. As a 
framework for the understanding of the conflict environment, Berdal identified four 
‘contextual categories: the question of the political end-state, historical context and 
psychological climate, violence and insecurity, and the political economy of war and 
peace.126 All four sets of issues are essential to the understanding of the conflict 
environment. However, the aim of this section – provide additional relevant insights –
focuses on the category of ‘the political economy and peace’. 
Knowledge about the issues of this category is fundamental to understand why 
complex conflicts tend to persevere regardless of all outside efforts to resolve them.  
Despite the majority of the population is longing for peace, there always will be forces 
that for several reasons wish to extend the conflict. These spoilers amass power and 
riches by exploiting the anarchy and lack of central control that typifies complex 
conflicts. They are not interested in rapid solutions but would rather work for the 
continuation of the conflict as long as possible. ‘Conventional wisdom’ shows that 
complex conflicts usually stem from political, economic, religious and social grievances. 
Berdal is stating that these grievances interacted with economic incentives and 
opportunities are triggering the outbreak of armed conflicts, but “that economic agendas 	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play a more critical role in sustaining violence once war has broken out”.127However, he 
also argues that it will never be possible to separate the political and economical agendas 
completely. It is knowledge about the interaction between these agendas that is essential 
for the understanding of the conflict environment.  
Hence, it is important to realize that armed conflicts are not just a “violent 
breakdown of a system, but also as the emergence of a new and alternative system of 
power, profit and protection”.128 In complex conflicts the spoilers that form this network 
can not only be found on the adversarial side, but also within the government structures 
that the outsiders are trying to create or stabilize. It is these spoiler-networks that can 
have a devastating effect on the efforts to build legitimacy and stability. Without a deep 
understanding of these spoiler-networks, outsider’s actions will continue to produce 
wicked and unintended consequences and will do more harm than good to the 
achievement of winning the will of the people.129  
 
These spoiler-networks will also disrupt the achievement of long-term policy objectives.  
Economic development, the institutionalisation of rule of law, respect for human rights, 
and the spread of democracy are vital for reducing the chances of renewed conflict. 
However, according to the American-Iranian philosopher Vali Nasr these objectives are 
unachievable without a middle class.130 These objectives will not be embraced if they do 
not serve the economical and social interests of the population.131 In complex conflicts a 
substantial part of the population depends, for these interests, on the structures and 
networks of spoilers. And as long as these dependency-relationships exist, it will be 
problematical to win the will of the people. 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the term complex conflicts is presented as an umbrella concept to 
describe the most relevant characteristics of the contemporary armed conflicts. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  127	  Berdal,	  2007,	  p.	  124.	  128	  Ibid,	  p.	  125.	  129	  Ibid,	  p.	  126.	  130	  NRC	  Next,	  7	  October	  2009.	  www.robwijnberg.nl/blog/essay-­‐zin-­‐82-­‐geen-­‐democratie-­‐zonder-­‐economie-­‐in-­‐afghanistan/	  131	  This	   concept	   is	  materialized	   in	   the	  U.S.	  DoD	  Task	  Force	   for	  Business	   and	  Stability	  Operations	  (TFBSO)	  which	  was	  established	   in	   June	  2006	  to	  aid	   in	   the	  revitalization	  of	   Iraq’s	  economy	  and	   in	  creating	   jobs	   for	   the	   Iraqi	   people.	  In	   2010,	   TFBSO	   began	   operations	   aimed	   at	   creating	   economic	  opportunities	  for	  the	  people	  of	  Afghanistan;	  http://tfbso.defense.gov/.	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chapter provides enough insights into complex conflicts to understand the intelligence 
needs of policy and decision-makers. In chapter two certain aspects of intelligence were 
explored, which have influence on the relevance of intelligence. These two chapters 
combined provide a framework of analysis that will be helpful in identifying 
bottlenecks, and in identifying or developing solutions.  
 
To gain more insight in relationships concerning the relevance of intelligence, four 
hypotheses have been developed. These hypotheses are focused issues of which there is 
insufficient information in the literature, or of which there are dissimilar opinions.   
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: If intelligence does include the assessment of own policy choices or 
decisions, the relevance will increase because of the significant effects of own actions on 
the operational environment. 
 
In complex conflicts policy and decision delivery is not a linear process – leading from 
policy ideas through implementation to change on the ground – but rather a more 
circular process involving continuous learning, adaption and improvement with policy 
and decisions changing in response to implementation and vice versa.132 What is the role 
of intelligence in this circular process? 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: If intelligence reports are publicly shared, their relevance will 
increase because more stakeholders can use it in their policy and decision-making 
process, and it will improve the exchange of information. 
 
This hypothesis refers to continuous debate about the dichotomy openness/secrecy. 
Releasing reports will improve the usability for policy and decision-making. An aspect 
that in complex conflicts, with its large number of stakeholders, is even more relevant. 
But what is the actual effect of the intelligence reports, on your information position, 
when they are made public? 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3: If intelligence is focussed on the opponent’s intentions and 
capabilities, this will influence the relevance of intelligence in a negative way. 	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A deep understanding of the social relationships, economic and other disputes, and 
power brokers is crucial to achieve the objective of winning the will of the people. 
However, many of the intelligence models and processes have their roots in the Cold 
War period in which intelligence had to deal with major crises, or routine reviews. One 
of Michael Handel’s statements is a typical example of this period: “All information 
gathered by intelligence concerns either the adversary’s intentions or his capabilities”.133 
To what extend are the current models and processes still useful in conflicts where the 
key threat to be mastered is the conflict environment itself, rather than a particular 
enemy?  
 
HYPOTHESIS 4: If the intelligence producers are close to the policy and decision-
makers, this will influence the relevance of intelligence in a positive way.   
 
In a complex, dynamic, and interdependent conflict environment, it can be difficult for 
the policy and decision-makers to recognize relevant or actionable intelligence. Another 
potential weakness is that – because of the complexity - they act on irrelevant 
intelligence. The closer the producers are to the policy and decision-makers, the better 
the latter may be in recognizing relevant intelligence. To make this possible relationship 
explicit, it is presented as a hypothesis. 
 
After having described the conceptual framework and the hypotheses, the next issue is to 
identify and discuss the most significant bottlenecks, and possible solutions. This part of 
the study will be conducted using a single case study - the Dutch operation in the 
province of Uruzgan, Afghanistan. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  133	  Michael	  Handel,	  “Intelligence	  and	  the	  problem	  of	  Strategic	  Surprise”,	  in	  Betts,	  2003,	  p.	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4 The Dutch perspective 
 
In this chapter the case is presented. What is the political context of the Dutch mission in 
Afghanistan, and what is the context of the Uruzgan province? What are the significant 
elements of the Dutch approach? How is the intelligence support for this mission 
organized? What are the achievements, and what are the challenges in Uruzgan?  
 
4.1 Context 
Political context  
Since the overthrowing of the Taliban regime in 2001, the international community is 
struggling to establish Afghanistan as a viable nation state. This mission has been facing 
many challenges. The first challenge is an ongoing insurgency predominantly conducted 
by the Taliban. Secondly, a crisis exists of popular confidence originating from various 
factors like weakness of government institutions134, the unlimited and unpunished abuse 
of power by corrupt officials and power-brokers, and a longstanding lack of economic 
opportunity.135 To deal with these challenges two parallel missions were created. The 
first was the American-led counter-terrorist campaign, Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF). The second mission, which initially had little or no bearing with the Taliban 
insurgency, was the creation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).  
The UN-mandated ISAF operation was created in 2001 essentially as a 
peacekeeping operation. The intention of the operation was to establish a secure 
environment from which political, economic, and social reconstruction of the state could 
commence.136 The initial, multi-national ISAF mission was restricted to increasing the 
security in and around the capital Kabul. In august 2003 command was transferred to 
NATO, which conducted a phased expansion of the mission over Afghanistan. Phase 3 
of this expansion involved the deployment of ISAF to the problematic and dangerous 
south of the country, which was seen as Taliban country/heartland. This phase involved 
the deployment of 12.000 NATO ISAF troops to the six southernmost provinces: Zabul, 
Kandahar, Helmand, Nimroz, Day Kundi, and Uruzgan. This was implemented on 31 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  134	  Hillary	  Clinton,	  10	  November	  2009.	  www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5AB1IG20091112.	  135	  McCrystal,	  “Commander´s	  Initial	  Assessment”,	  HQ	  ISAF,	  Afghanistan,	  30	  August	  2009,	  p.	  2-­‐5.	  136	  UN,	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  1386,	  20	  December	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July 2006, when ISAF assumed command of the southern region of Afghanistan from 
US-led Coalition forces (OEF).137 
 
As part of this phase the Netherlands has deployed a taskforce to Uruzgan province, and 
started acting per 1 August 2006 as lead nation. The total Dutch contingent in southern 
Afghanistan – including an Air Task Force and the contribution to the headquarter 
Regional Command South (RC-S) in Kandahar - is about 2,200 troops strong.138 Initially 
the Dutch government decided that the mission would end after two years, but decided 
in November 2007 to extend the mission to 2010.139 After a long and difficult political 
discussion, which led to the fall of the Dutch government on 20 February 2010, it was 
inherently decided for the Dutch lead nation role in Uruzgan to ‘definitely’ end per 1 
August 2010.   
 
The rationale of the Dutch government to contribute to the Afghan mission is the 
consideration that the stabilization of Afghanistan is of great importance for the 
development of international peace and security and for countering international 
terrorism, which also threatens Europe.140 However, in the difficult Dutch political 
landscape the backgrounds to the decision-making process were rather diverse. 
Depending on the political party, the rationale was a mix of humanitarian motivations, 
international peace and security, counterterrorism, atlantism, being a reliable ally, and 
military ambitions.141 
 
Uruzgan province 
In the beginning of the mission in 2006, Uruzgan was considered as one of the poorest 
and most conservative provinces of Afghanistan, with a population traditionally 
depending on agriculture and animal husbandry. However, caused by a long period of 
drought and conflict, poppy had become the main source of income. The province was 
faced with serious lack of stability, governance and development. These problems were 
not only due to its marginal location and geographical characteristics, but has multiple 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  137	  http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm#evolution.	  138	  Kamerstuk	  2008-­‐2009,	  27925,	  nr.	  330,	  Tweede	  Kamer.	  139	  Kamerstuk	  2008-­‐2009,	  27925,	  nr.	  279,	  Tweede	  Kamer,	  p.3.	  140	  Kamerstuk	  2005-­‐2006,	  27925,	  nr.	  193,	  Tweede	  Kamer;	  ‘Brief	  van	  de	  ministers	  van	  Buitenlandse	  Zaken,	  van	  Defensie	  en	  voor	  Ontwikkelingssamenwerking	  aan	  de	  voorzitter	  van	  de	  Tweede	  Kamer	  der	  Staten-­‐Generaal’,	  22	  December	  2005.	  141	  Interview	  with	  Wilfred	  Rietdijk	  by	  the	  author,	  22	  March	  2010.	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dimensions that developed historically: ethnic, presence of competing tribal militias, 
conflicting political and ideological inclinations, fundamentalist religious groups, 
presence of drugs syndicates, access to natural resources (land, water, wealth), and 
insurgency from outside the province supported from within. 142 
 
The former governor of Uruzgun, Jan Mohammad Khan, played a crucial role in the 
process in which a substantial part of the population alienated from the government and 
choose the side of the Taliban.143 In his period as governor, 2002-2006, he favored his 
own Popalzai tribe and used extreme violence against rival tribal groupings. These 
marginalized tribal groupings were more or less forced to choose the side of the Taliban.  
Supported by these marginalized groupings, the Taliban had in 2006 an extensive 
presence in the province. For the Afghan government and international forces was 
access to substantial parts of the province extremely problematic.144But, Jan Mohammad 
is not the only reason for the population to choose the side of the Taliban. It is an 
extremely complex process in which coercion by the Taliban, social relationships, 
economic and other disputes, power brokers, and a failing government all play a certain 
role (figure 4.1). 
Figure 4.1 Model of local dynamics 
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  Tussentijdse	  evaluatie	  ISAF	  2008,	  9	  September	  2009,	  Tweede	  Kamer,	  p.	  3.	  143	  Martine	  van	  Bijlert,	  Unruly	  Commanders	  and	  Violent	  Power	  Struggles,	  Taliban	  Networks	  in	  Uruzgan,	  in	  Giustozzi	  A,	  Decoding	  the	  New	  Taliban,	  London:	  2009,	  p.	  158;	  Tribal	  Liaison	  Office,	  “Three	  Years	  Later”,	  Kabul,	  18	  September	  2009,	  p.	  2.	  144	  Tussentijdse	  evaluatie	  ISAF	  2008,	  9	  September	  2009,	  Tweede	  Kamer,	  p.	  4.	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Another important factor to realize is the opportunistic character of the Afghan 
population. Based on the just described dynamics, a substantial part of the population 
will choose the side of the Taliban or the Afghan government. However, the effect of the 
Afghan opportunism is that the population will make this choice based on short-term 
considerations. They will choose to support the other side, if that benefits them at that 
moment the most. This ‘swing-voters’ behavior makes it extremely difficult to measure 
how much progress is made in winning the will of the people. 
 
Figure 4.2 Concept of Swing Voters 
 
4.2 The Dutch approach  
The mission of the Dutch taskforce is to assist the Afghan authorities in protecting the 
people of Uruzgan against the influence of insurgents, to improve their basic living 
conditions, and to accelerate structural and sustainable Afghan-led development.145 The 
intention is to create a condition in which the Afghan authorities themselves are able to 
guarantee a secure environment for sustainable stability within the province. To support 
the Afghan authorities in this development process the priority of the mission is the 
reconstruction of the Afghan capacities within the administration, security (army and 
police), and the social-economical field.146 
 
The core elements of the task force Uruzgan (TFU) are a provincial reconstruction team 
(PRT) and a battle group. Other elements are an Australian mentoring task force (MTF) 
and the operational mentoring and liaison teams (OMLTs) for training and assisting the 
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  OPLAN	  008	  (BAZ)	  rev	  1.	  This	  is	  the	  four	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  operation	  plan	  based	  on	  COM	  ISAF	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  Rev	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Afghan army.147 The TFU is deployed in three forward operating bases – Camp Holland, 
Camp Hadrian, and the smaller Camp Mirwais in Chora – and several Platoon Bases 
(PBs), and Combat Out Posts (COPs)(map 4.1). 
 
Map 4.1 Uruzgan Province 
 
 
 
Inkblot strategy 
The first pillar in the Dutch approach is the so-called ‘inkblot strategy’. This typical 
counterinsurgency concept was reintroduced and implemented in South-Afghanistan by, 
amongst others, General Richards, commander ISAF from July 2006 till February 
2007.148 However, from the very first beginning of the mission the Dutch government 
already spoke about an inkblot approach.149 The TFU focus their operations on the 
populous areas of the districts of Tarin Kowt, Deh Rawod, and Chora (map 4.1). These 
three inkblots - or Afghan Development Zones (ADZs) – are areas where a relative large 	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  two	  Dutch	  OMLTs,	  there	  is	  a	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  France,	  and	  Slovakia.	  	  148	  Cyres	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  and	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  Search	  for	  Security	  in	  post-­‐Taliban	  Afghanistan,	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  Paper	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part of the Uruzgan population lives (about 70%).150 Another reason to focus on these 
areas is that because of the tribal composition, where the population has a relative 
positive attitude towards the Afghan authorities and ISAF. Therefore ISAF expected that 
in these areas most progress in winning the will of the people could be achieved. Within 
and adjacent to the ADZ the intention is to achieve progress on all three lines of 
operation - Defense, Diplomacy, and Development (3D). The aim is to create conditions 
for the Afghan government to be able to execute its authority, Afghan security forces to 
be able to guarantee a secure environment, and reconstruction efforts to be able to take 
place to improve the quality of life of the population (including infrastructure, education, 
and health care). The creation of such a condition is essential for the achievement of the 
overall objective: winning the will of the people. 
 Outside the ADZs the objective is to suppress the Taliban to such a level that they 
cannot effectively interfere with the efforts to stabilize and extend the ADZs. This 
disruption of the Taliban is achieved by focussed operations on all three lines of 
operation.151 Not only by kinetic operations aimed at the Taliban, but also by a careful 
exploitation of local personalities and local grievances that can drive a wedge between 
the Taliban and the population of Uruzgan.  
 During the operation it became clear that a prerequisite for the level of success of 
the inkblot strategy is the availability of Afghan capacity in the field of administration 
and security. If the TFU was going too fast in the expansion of the ADZs, the danger 
existed that TFU’s assets were too much spread out and thereby overstretched. The 
removal of the Taliban, without sufficient own or Afghan capacity to ‘hold’ the area, 
resulted in the opponent regaining the control over the area in due course. The 
consequence of this was a decrease of the credibility of the TFU and Afghan 
authorities.152 As a result, the TFU has chosen for the approach of a slow extension of 
the ADZs. The lesson learned is that expansion can only take place if there is sufficient 
Afghan and/or ISAF capacity available to fill the vacuum. The starting point in the 
planning and execution of operations is nowadays ‘permanent presence’.153 Operations 
with the aim of removing the Taliban are directly followed by reconstruction activities – 
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the concept of shape, clear, hold and build.154 However, this Dutch approach is 
according to major-general De Kruif, commander RC-South from 1 November 2008 till 
1 November 2009, not different from that of the other countries in RC-South.155 What is 
remarkable is that it seems that each country – at least the Dutch – had to learn this 
expensive lesson on its own.  
 
Map 4.2 ADZs / Inkblots end 2007 and end 2008 
 
 
3D-approach 
The second pillar of the Dutch strategy, the 3D-approach, is also not a unique one. More 
or less all partner nations are employing the same combination of civilian and military 
means in assisting the stabilization and development of Afghanistan, however, often 
using another name for the same concept such as ‘comprehensive approach’, ‘whole of 
government approach’, or ‘integrated missions’.156 The ‘Dutch approach’ may have 
specific characteristics, the general concept behind it is conventional wisdom. 
 
Three characteristics are identified, in which the combination and the degree of 
implementation are considered specific to the ‘Dutch-approach’. Firstly, from the 
beginning of the operation the Netherlands has invested a considerable amount of 
resources in understanding the context of the operation. On the local level ethnic, tribal, 
economic, criminal, and political grievances play a decisive role. Efforts to win the 
support of the population without knowledge of these root causes were not seen to lead 	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  ‘clear-­‐hold-­‐build	  operation’.	  155	  Major-­‐general	  Mart	  de	  Kruif	  in	  conversation	  with	  colonel	  Gary	  Keck,	  US	  DoD	  20	  March	  2009.	  http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2009/03/mil-­‐090320-­‐dod02.htm.	  156	  MoD,	  Army	  Field	  Manual	  Vol.	  1	  Combined	  Arms	  Operations.	  Part	  9	  Tactics	  for	  Stabilization	  
Operations,	  London:	  MoD,	  2005,	  p.	  A-­‐3;	  Norwegian	  Armed	  Forces	  Joint	  Operational	  Doctrine,	  2007,	  p.170.	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to a sustainable result and were seen to be counterproductive.157 Secondly, a real 
integrated approach. The Netherlands has chosen to integrate the military and civilian 
staff into one organization, already in the preparation phase of the operation. A further 
outcome of emphasizing the civilian element is that since the beginning of 2009 the PRT 
is civilian-led.158 Thirdly, by ‘below the radar’ development efforts and also giving the 
security efforts as much as possible an ‘Afghan face’, the support of the population and 
the legitimacy of the Afghan authorities has increased significantly.159 
 
Concept of restraint 
As of the beginning of 2008 a third pillar was added to the Dutch strategy – the concept 
of restraint. The aim of this concept is to avoid civilian casualties and collateral damage. 
Civilian casualties and collateral damage resulting from an over-reliance on firepower 
and force protection severely damaged ISAF’s legitimacy in the eyes of the Uruzgan 
people. Therefore, the intention is to limit any form of violence as much as possible. In 
principle the use of violence is limited to self-defence and focussed targeting operations 
on Taliban leadership.160 However, it is important to realize that there is a certain limit 
on this principle. An important objective is still to suppress the Taliban to such a level 
that they cannot effectively interfere with efforts to stabilize and extend the ADZs. 
Hence, offensive operations are occasionally a ‘necessarily evil’. This concept of 
restraint is nowadays also part of McCrystal’s new approach, and is considered as an 
important factor in not losing the will of the people.161 
 
4.3 Intelligence support 
This section focuses on the intelligence support of the policy and decision-makers of the 
Dutch government and the Dutch contingent in Afghanistan. Afghanistan and the 
intelligence support of the mission is according to the so-called ‘assignment decision’ of 
the Minister-President a responsibility of the NL-DISS.162 For intelligence agencies like 
the NL-DISS secrecy is an important component of its activities. As explained in chapter 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  157	  Tussentijdse	  evaluatie	  ISAF	  2008,	  9	  September	  2009,	  Tweede	  Kamer,	  p.	  41.	  158	  http://www.yourdefence.nl/mod/forum/discuss.php?d=68.	  159	  Tussentijdse	  evaluatie	  ISAF	  2008,	  9	  September	  2009,	  Tweede	  Kamer,	  p.	  41.	  160	  Interview	  with	  Wilfred	  Rietdijk	  by	  the	  author,	  16	  May	  2010.	  161	  McCrystal,	  “Commander´s	  Initial	  Assessment”,	  HQ	  ISAF,	  Afghanistan,	  30	  August	  2009,	  p.	  2-­‐10.	  162	  With	  the	  ‘aanwijsbesluit’	  the	  Prime-­‐Minister	  assigns	  the	  intelligence	  responsibility	  over	  a	  certain	  country	  to	  the	  MIVD	  or	  AIVD;	  NL-­‐DISS,	  Jaarverslag	  2008,	  29	  April	  2009,	  p.8.	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2, the NL-DISS has a need to protect its sensitive information, sources, and methods. 
Hence, there are limitations to what can be described in this section. The pitfalls and 
biases of intelligence support are discussed in the next chapter.  
 
During the mission in South-Afghanistan, the cooperation between the NL-DISS and 
their most important partners has significantly intensified. The most tangible result of 
this intensification is Dutch membership of the so-called 5-eyes community for the 
duration of the mission.163 5-eyes relates to the far-reaching intelligence cooperation 
between the US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK, which has its origin in 
the Second World War. Because of this participation the NL-DISS has access to 
intelligence sources and products that are normally not available to them. As a result, the 
NL-DISS is able to provide its consumers – policy and decision makers in The Hague, 
TFU, and partners – with higher quality intelligence.164 
 
An important element in the intelligence support of the mission is the operational team 
(Team Afghanistan) within the NL-DISS. This team has a crucial role within the 
intelligence cycle. Firstly, it is responsible for all analysis and production of intelligence 
products – almost the whole processing phase. Secondly, this team acts as the most 
important feedback mechanism within the entire framework of the cycle. As Sir David 
Oman pointed out, the most important prerequisite for a functioning intelligence process 
is such a feedback mechanism.165 The feedback ability of the team is positively 
influenced by the fact that the NL-DISS is a relative small agency. The analysis and 
production division and the collection divisions - human intelligence (HUMINT) and 
signals intelligence (SIGINT) – are part of the same organization. The result is very 
short lines, which are even further exploited by the fact that the collection divisions are 
represented within Team Afghanistan. To guarantee the feedback with the consumers in 
theatre the NL-DISS has deployed forward elements – National Intelligence Support 
Team (NIST) or National Intelligence Cell (NIC). These forward elements act as an 
interface between Team Afghanistan, the TFU, and other consumers in theatre. They are 
the assurance function for the operational team to know the consumer’s intelligence 
requirements, and for the consumers to know/understand the relevant intelligence or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  163	  DNI,	  Intelligence	  Community	  Directive,	  503,15	  September	  2008,	  p.7. 164	  Tussentijdse	  evaluatie	  ISAF	  2008,	  9	  September	  2009,	  Tweede	  Kamer,	  p.	  21.	  165	  Presentation	  by	  Sir	  David	  Omand	  at	  the	  Professional	  Advanced	  Intelligence	  Course	  at	  FHS,	  Oslo,	  September	  2009.	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information. It is policy for team-members to deploy on a regular base to these forward 
elements. This concept is not unique for NL-DISS. Most partners in Afghanistan are 
using a similar concept. 
 
4.4 Assessment 
Eight years after the overthrowing of the Taliban regime and four years after a more 
intense ISAF-presence in the South, ISAF did not succeed to improve peace and stability 
in the Afghan Pashtun-provinces.  
  With the arrival of additional US forces mainly in the South and ISAF’s 
increased operational tempo, the level of violence has risen, as expected. Considering 
the low number of violent incidents, Uruzgan seems to be ‘quieter’ than the other 
provinces in the South.166 Despite initial skepticism from larger NATO members when 
the Dutch took command of Uruzgan in August 2006, the troubled province is now 
widely seen as one of the few positive developments in Afghanistan’s increasingly 
insecure South.167 According to the Tribal Liaison Office (TLO) in Uruzgan the security 
situation has improved, the provision of basic services is improving, and the economy is 
showing initial positive changes.168 This relative success in Uruzgan is often believed to 
be the result of the ‘Dutch Approach’.169 However, speaking about a Dutch success is 
perhaps premature. A different reason for the relative stability could be the fact that 
Uruzgan is outside the Taliban’s main effort. Taliban operations are mainly focussed on 
Kandahar province and the northeast of Helmand. Besides this, the Taliban within 
Uruzgan have significant leadership issues, which was a cause for major problems with 
the coordination of their operations.170 These leadership issues were even further 
exploited through direct actions of US and Australian Special Forces.171 
  The security, development and rule of law gains made in Uruzgan are also both 
fragile and limited. A main problem is transferring responsibility to an Afghan 
government that many citizens see as unrepresentative and either unwilling or unable to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  166	  Ministerie	  van	  Buitenlandse	  Zaken,	  Stand	  van	  zaken	  brief	  Afghanistan,	  14	  Octobr,	  2009,	  p.11.	  167	   See	   for	   example,	   “U.S.	   takes	   Dutch	   Military	   as	   Role	   Model	   in	   Afghanistan”,	   The	   Wall	   Street	  
Journal,	  4	  May	  2009	  ;	  http://online.wsj.com/articl	  e/SB124105482098871505.html	  	  168	  Tribal	  Liaison	  Office,	  “Three	  Years	  Later”,	  Kabul,	  18	  September	  2009,	  p.	  2.	  169	  See	  for	  example,	  “The	  Dutch	  model;	  Afghanistan’s	  Uruzgan	  province”,	  The	  Economist,	  US	  edition,	  14	  March	  2009.	  170	  Ministerie	  van	  Buitenlandse	  Zaken,	  Stand	  van	  zaken	  brief	  Afghanistan,	  14	  Octobr,	  2009,	  p.11.	  171	  Tussentijdse	  evaluatie	  ISAF	  2008,	  9	  September	  2009,	  Tweede	  Kamer,	  p.	  11.	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offer basic service provision or security to the population at large.172 One more reason 
why the developments are fragile is the role of Jan Mohammad Khan’s network. Jan 
Mohammad can be considered to be the most important ‘spoiler-force’ on the side of the 
Afghan government. Since 2006 Jan Mohammad stopped being the official governor, 
but de facto he still represents President Karzai. In this position he succeeded to extend 
his power due to the cooperation with coalition forces and the increase of foreign funds 
that were spend in Uruzgan as development- and military aid. Because his network is 
providing security to most of the military and civilian logistic transports, the coalition 
forces are to a certain degree dependant on him. This dominant position allows him to 
control a significant part of the transport of opium – the major source of income in 
Uruzgan.173 According to the TLO the growing polarization between Jan Mohammad’s 
network and most of the rest of the population is the main driver of politics, conflict and 
violence in the province.174 Hence, the cooperation with Jan Mohammad will most 
probably have a negative effect on TFU’s efforts to build legitimacy. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The beginning of complex conflict wisdom is to grasp the implications of Clausewitz’s 
famous rule. He insisted that “the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of 
judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish the kind of war 
on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, 
something that is alien to its nature. This is first of all strategic questions and the most 
comprehensive”.175 It seems that the Dutch policy- and decision makers had a thorough 
understanding of the conflict from the beginning, and that most of the characteristics of 
complex conflicts have been taken into consideration in the decision-making processes.  
From the start, the focus of the mission was on the construction of the Afghan capacity 
within the administration, security, and the social-economical field.176 This focus reflects 
the way in which the inkblot strategy and 3D-approach is planned and executed. A 
logical consequence of this is, that the PRT is the main effort of the TFU.  
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  Tribal	  Liaison	  Office,	  “Three	  Years	  Later”,	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  September	  2009,	  p.	  16.	  173	  Confidential	  interview	  by	  the	  author,	  30	  March	  2010.	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  Tribal	  Liaison	  Office,	  “Three	  Years	  Later”,	  Kabul,	  18	  September	  2009,	  p.	  4.	  175	  Clausewtiz,	  On	  War,	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This Dutch approach is sometimes presented as something unique. However, the 
concepts and principles used in the Dutch strategy are all in line with the conventional 
wisdom about complex conflicts, and nowadays implemented by all partners. However, 
some countries were faster than others in implementing these principles in their strategy. 
Just as it took a while before the Dutch discovered that ‘clear’ activities, if they are not 
directly followed by ‘hold’ and ‘build’ activities, will result in little or even negative 
effects.177 And, since one of the significant characteristics of complex conflicts is that 
they are considered as an adapting competition - the actor who learns and adapts the 
fastest will win – you cannot afford to lose expensive time to adapt. Therefore, if 
General McChrystal’s initial assessment is right, you could assume that during the last 
eight years of the conflict the international community did not learn and adapt fast 
enough. In essence, the Taliban were given the time and space to recover from their 
defeat in 2001; they made good use of this time to expand and consolidate their control 
of a substantial part of the Pashtun population. 
 
Relation with complex conflict theory 
As stated, the Dutch approach in Uruzgan is often sold as a success story. The 
Economist praises the approach in an article titled: The Dutch model. "Amid the gloom 
of recent assessments of the progress of its war in Afghanistan, Nato has seen a flicker 
of light in an unexpected province: Uruzgan," the magazine writes. But The Economist 
also warns that "Afghanistan has a history of turning success stories into horror 
movies."178 The most important reason for the ‘success’ might be that Uruzgan is not 
important for the Taliban. What are the effects if the Taliban focuses more on Uruzgan? 
What are the effects of the increasing power of Jan Mohammad’s spoiler network? The 
gains made in Uruzgan are both fragile and limited. Mats Berdal’s concept of ‘the 
economy of war and peace’ seems to be very relevant in Uruzgan. 
 
It is understandable that the public opinion in the Netherlands has always been rather 
sceptical about the mission in Uruzgan.179 News about Afghanistan, including Uruzgan, 
is mostly negative. The public does not have the feeling that ISAF is on track in 	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  See	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  more,	  G.R.	  Dimitriu	  and	  B.A.	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  The	  Dutch	  COIN-­‐approach:	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  year	  Uruzgan,	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stabilizing Afghanistan - which was also McCrystal’s opinion. The combination of this 
lack of   progress and ‘soft’ political objectives makes it difficult for the Dutch 
government to maintain the support of the population. There are limits to what the Dutch 
population -and thus the government - is willing to invest, both time and resources in 
stabilizing Afghanistan. It is this weak ‘Clausewitzian triangle’ that makes the policy 
and decision makers more concerned about the management of short-term risks, than 
dealing with long-term threats - not dealing with the problem anymore, but managing 
the risk at acceptable level. 
 
Figure 4.3 Dutch and Taliban Clausewitzian Triangle 
 
 
 
In addition, Christopher Coker’s concept of ‘wicked problem’ appears to be applicable 
in Afghanistan. The international community does not agree on a definition of the 
problem. Some feel they can talk to the Taliban; that the movement has to be part of the 
solution. Some stakeholders question the wisdom of trying to eliminate opium 
production, and denying a considerable part of the population a source of income. Others 
claim that it is the spoiler networks that feed instability and corruption. None of these 
views is mutually exclusive, and none of them is necessarily wrong.180 According to 
Coker, the managing process ends when resources are depleted, stakeholders lose 
interest, or political realities change.181 Afghanistan most probably stops to be a wicked 
problem for the Netherlands as of 1st August 2010.  
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Insurgents can, against costs which are unlimited acceptable, create costs by their 
opponent which are limited acceptable, even if they lose every (tactical) battle, win the 
war (Sir Robert Thompson, “Regular Armies and Insurgency”, 1979) 
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5 Bottlenecks 
 
After the description of the conceptual framework and presentation of the case, the next 
topic is the identification and discussion the most significant pitfalls and biases 
concerning the relevance of intelligence for policy and decision-making. These 
bottlenecks will be identified and analyzed within the context of the case and within the 
provided framework of intelligence and complex conflicts. The identification and 
discussion of the bottlenecks is based on interviews with relevant intelligence producers 
and consumers, and the study of ‘practitioners insights’.    
 
In January 2010, McChrystal’s senior intelligence officer, Major General Michael T. 
Flynn, published an extremely relevant, and within the intelligence community well-
known report about the failure of intelligence in Afghanistan over the last eight years.182 
According to Flynn "the vast intelligence apparatus is unable to answer fundamental 
questions about the environment in which US and allied forces operate and the people 
they seek to persuade. Ignorant of local economics and landowners, hazy about who the 
powerbrokers are and how they might be influenced, incurious about the correlations 
between various development projects and the levels of cooperation among villagers, 
and disengaged from people in the best position to find answers".183 
Flynn’s essential line of thought is not that they are doing a bad job, but that they 
are doing the wrong sort of job. Too focused on the enemy and not able to see and, more 
import tell the big picture of the country they are in. He urges them to get out of 
headquarters, work with soldiers on the ground, talk to people and act more like 
journalists, as well as historians and librarians. Flynn states that ninety percent of 
intelligence work these days is "open source", and quotes a former head of intelligence 
saying that the job should be more Sherlock Holmes than James Bond.184 A single-
minded obsession with IEDs is understandable but inexcusable if local commanders 
cannot outsmart insurgents as a result, and concludes "the intelligence community - the 
brains behind the bullish might of military forces - seems much too mesmerized by the 	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red of the Taliban's cape. If this does not change, success in Afghanistan will depend on 
the dubious premise that a bull will not tire as quickly as a Russian bear".185As 
McChrystal stated, “the conflict will be won by persuading the population, not by 
destroying the enemy”. According to Flynn is too much of the intelligence community 
deaf to this direction.186 
 
The aim of Flynn’s report is to provide the intelligence community with a blueprint for 
the process of making intelligence relevant in Afghanistan. Hence, the purpose of 
Flynn’s report is closely related to the purpose of this study. Some of the bottlenecks in 
his report discussed are very recognizable in the Dutch situation, some in a much less 
degree, and some not at all. Besides the Dutch context, the main distinction is that 
whereas Flynn has an operational/problem solving perspective, this study is conducted 
from an academic/theoretical perspective. Hence, this study and Flynn’s report 
complement each other in the process of providing the policy and decision-makers with 
more relevant knowledge.    
 
Accessibility 
The first bottleneck to be discussed refers to continuous debate about the dichotomy 
openness/secrecy. In the literature on intelligence, it is broad accepted that the issues and 
aspects that need to be kept secret must be reduced to a minimum, and that releasing 
reports will improve the usability for policy and decision-making.187 However, during 
the mission in South-Afghanistan, the NL-DISS did not produce one single unclassified 
intelligence report.188 The released ‘open’ information was limited to an input in several 
policy documents.189 The accessibility of the reports was even further limited to the fact 
that The Netherlands was part of the earlier described 5-eyes community. Due to this 
membership the NL-DISS had access to large numbers of relevant intelligence reports 
and single source information (mainly SIGINT and HUMINT). Even when the NL-DISS 
used a fraction of 5-eyes information in its own reports, the consequence was 
automatically a considerable restriction on the releasability of these reports. Hence, most 	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of the NL-DISS reports were limited released to the US, UK, Australia, Canada, and 
New Zealand.190 This classification of reports has broad and significant consequences – 
in theatre, international, and domestic.  
 
The consequences in theatre are well known and rather obvious. As stated, the 
stabilization and development of Afghanistan requires a combination of military 
achievements and diplomacy, economic, and social incentives. Hence, tackling the 
Afghan problem requires a large number of civilian actors such as NGOs, development 
organizations, IOs, and even commercial businesses. All these stakeholders have the 
same need as ISAF to understand the ethnic, tribal, economic, criminal, and political 
grievances - the context of their operation. Without this knowledge their efforts will 
contribute less to the stabilization and development of Afghanistan/Uruzgan.  
The international consequences are rather obvious as well, but less recognized. 
International actors such as the UN, EU, ISAF, and even NATO only have limited own 
intelligence assets. Therefore, these organizations depend mainly on national 
intelligence inputs.191 The more restricted national intelligence reports are, the less 
accessible they are for these organizations. For example reports with a 5-eyes 
releasability will not be accessible by NATO. Already at the end of 2006 the assessment 
of the NL-DISS, and some other 5-eyes partners in South-Afghanistan, was that the 
stabilization and development was not heading in the right direction. The intelligence 
reports stated clearly that, although some progress could be identified, many indicators 
suggested the overall situation was deteriorating. The Taliban had the initiative and there 
was a crisis of confidence among Afghans in both their government and the international 
community – we were losing the battle over the will of the people.192 However, it took 
until the second half of 2009, when General McCrystal presented his initial assessment, 
before the international community really woke up.193 Before that, NATO’s general 
assessment of the situation in Afghanistan was that progress was going (too) slow, but 
the operation was still heading in the right direction. This did not mean that NATO was 
not concerned about the situation, though NATO’s concern was mainly based on the fear 
that the contributing nation’s support would disappear because there was not enough 
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progress.194 It seems that NATO still did not realize that they were losing the battle over 
the will of the people.195 
The domestic consequences were neither obvious nor recognized, at both the 
strategic and tactical level. At the tactical level the classification of intelligence reports 
has negative effect on the mission-preparation. A key factor in winning the will of the 
people in Uruzgan is a careful exploitation of local personalities and local grievances.196 
A prerequisite for this is a thorough knowledge and understanding of the social 
relationships, economic and other disputes, and power brokers of the local communities. 
To obtain this knowledge and understanding requires an investment in a considerable 
amount of time, which will not be available during the execution of the mission. Hence, 
the main part of this knowledge an understanding should be obtained during the 
preparation-phase, which requires sufficient access to the most relevant intelligence 
products. Unfortunately at the tactical level access to classified documents is 
problematic, and the usability for the preparation is far from optimal.197 
At the political strategic level there is only very limited group of policy-makers 
who have access to intelligence products on a regular base. Within the relevant 
ministries – defence, foreign affairs, and general affairs - intelligence has always been 
available on a daily base. A small group of parliament members, the parliamentary 
Intelligence and Security Services Committee (the ‘Secret Committee’) had access on a 
regular base. However, a vast majority of members of the parliament and other 
ministries did not have access at all.198 After the presentation of the report of the 
Committee of Inquiry on Iraq, in January 2010, the government made some decisions, 
which slightly improved this situation. For example, from that moment, the NL-DISS 
has to agree about how the government incorporates their reports in various policy 
documents.199 The bottom line is that still the vast majority of policy-makers – 
government as well parliament members – do not have access to NL-DISS assessments 
on a regular base. This context has significant consequences for the relevance of 
intelligence for policy-making. As explained in chapter 2, intelligence products have 	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more long-term effects in shaping the policy-maker’s frame of mind rather than short-
term effects on identifiable decisions. It is the constant flow of intelligence and other 
sources of knowledge such as the media that shape decisions and actions, rather than 
specific sets of intelligence.200 Hence, most policy-maker’s frame of mind is not shaped 
by NL-DISS reports. 
 
The conclusion of this discussion is that the classification of intelligence products 
decreases significantly the relevance for several important policy and decision-making 
processes. So the question arises, why the NL-DISS did not put more effort in the 
production of unclassified reports? The interviews conducted with several analysts and 
managers of the NL-DISS did not result in a clear answer. The ‘intelligence culture’ 
could be a dominant factor in explaining this predisposition - as Michael Herman 
pointed out “secrecy is intelligence’s trademark: the basis of its relationship with 
government and its own self-image.”201 Without any doubt, the risk exists, if intelligence 
is too unrestricted, for sensitive information, sources, and methods to be compromised. 
However, in many cases it is attainable to paraphrase the reports in such a way that they 
can be declassified without the risk of disclosure, and without losing its significance.202 
Two arguments were given for the reason why the declassification of reports is never 
done. Firstly, the high stress on the production-process. There is simply no production 
capacity (made) available to spend time on declassification. Secondly, the most direct 
and obvious consumers - Minister of Defense, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Defense 
staff, and TFU – all have access to classified reports.203  
 
With this approach the NL-DISS significantly under-utilizes its products. The 
intelligence needs of the indirect and less obvious consumers are not given enough 
attention, which to some extent is caused by a false assumption that unclassified reports 
are less relevant, and by too much risk aversion. 
 
Acceptance 
According to Michael Handel, one of the most critical phases in the intelligence cycle is 
convincing the policy and decision-makers to make best use of the provided 	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intelligence.204 The policy and decision-makers of the Dutch government and the Dutch 
contingent in Afghanistan will be more receptive to intelligence if the NL-DISS has a 
good reputation concerning objectivity, accuracy, and quality of assessments. In 
addition, the relationship between the policy and decision-makers and the NL-DISS 
plays an important role.  
  In general the conclusion is there are no significant shortfalls identified during 
the operation in this field. The relevance and importance of the NL-DISS assessments 
for the decision-making processes at both the strategic and the operational level, is 
broadly accepted and well regarded.205 For example the Dutch government demanded 
from President Karzai for Jan Mohammad to be removed as governor, before they took 
over the lead nation role in Uruzgan. The knowledge and insights to understand the need 
for this demand was provided by NL-DISS intelligence.206It was only in the first year of 
the operation that especially PRT-commanders were complaining about insufficient 
intelligence on the field of diplomacy and development.207 Nowadays, it is estimated 
that about ninety percent of all relevant intelligence in Uruzgan is originated from the 
NL-DISS.208 
 
However, on a few occasions the policy and decision-makers did not make best use of 
the provided intelligence. Insights and understanding of the processes, which led to the 
disregarding of relevant intelligence, will help answering the central research question.  
The most evident examples are the NL-DISS assessments as from end of 2006 
concerning the deteriorating situation in southern Afghanistan. The assessment, that the 
ISAF was in fact losing the battle over the will of the people, was difficult to accept for 
the majority of the Dutch policy and decision-makers.209 The main cause for this 
phenomenon is a combination of three well-known causes for failures in the literature on 
intelligence – ‘discourse failure’, ‘confirmation bias’, and ‘cognitive dissonance’. These 
causes for intelligence failures can be identified within three different actors – US 
Intelligence, ISAF commanders, and Dutch policy-makers.  
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Within the US Intelligence a ‘discourse failure’ caused for their assessments to be too 
positive about the achievements in Afghanistan. The concept of discourse failure is 
based on the idea that what we see as threats are, to a certain extent, shaped by the ideas 
we have of the world around us, and this is likely to have a direct impact on the focus 
and perception of the Intelligence agencies.210 In contrast with the ‘soft’ political 
objectives of the Dutch government, the rationale behind the US involvement in 
Afghanistan is in the context of the ‘global war against terror’. Statements like "we'll 
smoke them out of their holes", or Obama’s message to al-Qaeda "we will defeat you", 
are part the US discourse concerning Afghanistan.211 In such a context it is explainable 
that most US intelligence was enemy-centric, and that they were not receptive to 
indicators concerning winning the will of the people. The US discourse failure is a 
failure of comprehension: the limitation of the language and vocabulary to identify, 
analyze, and accept that the overall situation was deteriorating.  
 
The assessment of most ISAF commanders about the situation in Afghanistan was that 
progress was going slow, but the operation was still heading in the right direction. For 
example Major General Ton van Loon, former commander RC-S, stated in June 2007 
that the Taliban have “lost the war", they remain dangerous in some parts of the country, 
but are unable to launch an effective offensive.212 A ‘confirmation bias’ was the main 
cause for this shortfall to see that the situation was deteriorating. Confirmation bias is 
the human tendency to notice and look for information that confirms one’s beliefs, and 
ignore, not look for, or undervalue the relevance of information that contradicts it.213 
This within the social psychology well known bias is, to a certain extent, recognizable 
within most military commanders in Afghanistan.214 Van Loon and his colleagues may 
believe that they were objective and rational, but forgot the psychological investment 
they made in the development of their own campaign plan.  
According to David Kilcullen ‘measuring progress’ is the best way to assess 
whether a campaign is on track or not. He also pointed out that the focus on the 	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achievement of total objectives is not the appropriate framework of analysis to assess 
progress.215 It is this focus on the achievements of (irrelevant) objectives in combination 
with the psychological investments that lead to the situation where ISAF commanders 
were not receptive for facts and dangers that stand in contradiction to their campaign 
plan. 
 
From the beginning, the Dutch government and parliament were heavily divided about 
the rationale behind the decision to contribute to the mission.216 This resulted in a 
political discussion about the main characteristic of the mission217  – a ‘fighting-mission’ 
versus a ‘reconstruction-mission’.218 The Dutch policy-makers knew that the political 
and popular support for the mission was vulnerable. The policy-makers realized that, if 
the mission was not heading in the right direction, the support would decrease even 
further.219 In other words, policy-makers needed ‘good news’ to be able to ‘sell’ the 
mission and retain popular support. However, the NL-DISS assessments did not contain 
much good news, which led to ‘cognitive dissonance’ amongst the policy-makers. 
Cognitive dissonance is the human tendency to prefer information that confirms existing 
belief to information that refutes it. Cognitive dissonance leads to similar results as 
confirmation bias.220 However, cognitive dissonance is more prominent when the 
discrepancy between one’s viewpoints about the situation in Afghanistan and the 
intelligence received about it is clear and cannot be ignored. Under these circumstances, 
the discrepancy is resolved by putting more weight to the information or interpretation 
that coincides with the present viewpoint and underestimating the evidence that 
contradicts it.221   
 
The information that coincided with the policy-maker’s beliefs was available in the form 
of the US and ISAF assessments. Hence, the acceptance of (dissident) NL-DISS 
assessments was negatively influenced by the combination of a discourse failure within 	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US intelligence, confirmation bias amongst ISAF commanders, and cognitive 
dissonance amongst Dutch policy-makers. (figure 5.1) However, it is important to 
realize that all causes will be present within all actors. For example a discourse failure 
will also play a role amongst the Dutch policy-makers, nevertheless the effect of 
cognitive dissonance is most prominent. Other causes such as the NL-DISS ‘track 
record’, personal relationships, and accessibility of intelligence will also have an 
influence on this process, but are less prominent.    
 
Figure 5.1 Process of policy-maker’s acceptance of dissident assessments 
 
 
 
Root causes 
The social, economical, and political factors of the operational environment formed from 
the beginning of the mission an integral part of Team Afghanistan’s analyses and 
assessments.222 However, many team members and consumers have the perception that 
the collection efforts and analytical brainpower are often still too much focused on 
insurgents instead of population-centric information.223 The main reason for this is that 
the necessary change of focus from enemy-centric to population-centric information is 
not yet embedded in a proper conceptual framework.224 Too much of what is done in the 
last years to make intelligence more relevant – population-centric – is based on the 
insights and achievements of individuals. The discussion in this section provides some 
insights into why there frequently is too much focus on insurgents, which will be useful 
for the development of a conceptual framework. 
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Validity of models 
All Dutch policy and decision-makers and intelligence producers understand that the 
conflict in Afghanistan is about winning the will of the people, and that addressing the 
core grievances is crucial for the achievement of this objective. However, translating 
these ideas and concepts in real plans and actions is something else. Many of the used 
concepts and procedures are not optimized for the utilization in complex conflicts. 
 
Clear examples of this can be found in the counterinsurgency ‘bible’, the JP 3-24. This 
US doctrine publication is considered to be the leading document for the development of 
other nation’s counterinsurgency doctrine – including The Netherlands. The process for 
the analysis of the operational environment is the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the 
Operational Environment (JIPOE). In contrast with the Cold War based Intelligence 
Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), the JIPOE emphasizes on socio-cultural and civil 
factors.225 However, not all characteristics of complex conflicts as described in chapter 3 
are reflected in a proper way. In step one of the JIPOE the population is divided in four 
main categories based on their attitude towards the government – positive, neutral, 
negative, and hostile. The crucial shortfall here is that the significance of the ‘spoilers’ is 
not enough emphasized. They are shortly mentioned, but do not play an important role 
in the further analysis.226 In the JP 3-24 is also stated that the support of the people is the 
most vital success-factor in the success of any COIN effort, and that the reinforcement 
of the legitimacy of the government should be the main objective.227 This is translated in 
a concept for how the approach the population, based on their attitude towards the 
government. (figure 5.2). 
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Figure 5.2 Range of popular support228 
 
 
As explained in chapter 4, dividing the population in categories based on their attitude 
towards the government is helpful in understanding the ‘swing-voters’ behaviour of a 
large part of the population (figure 4.2). However, if the attitude towards the government 
is the leading principle for how to engage the population, something crucial goes wrong. 
The spoilers cannot only be found on pro-Taliban side, but also on the pro-government 
side, and both can have a devastating effect on the efforts to build legitimacy. A clear 
example of such a pro-government spoiler is the former governor of Uruzgan, Jan 
Mohammad. His network is considered to be the main driver of politics, conflict and 
violence in the province.229 The consequence of the US model is that Jan Mohammad 
and his network is positioned on the ‘right’ side. Promoting him instead of marginalizing 
him will produce wicked and unintended consequences and most probably will do more 
harm than good to the achievement of gaining the support of the people.230  
 
The second shortfall can be found in step 3 and 4 of the JIPOE. While in step 1 and 2 – 
‘define the operational environment’ and ‘describe the impact of the operational 
environment’ – the focus is on the socio-cultural and civil factors. In step 3 and 4 – 
‘evaluate the adversary’ and ‘determine adversary courses of action’ – the focus is 
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Figure III-1. Range of Popular Support 
nested in larger, complex, and irregular conflicts; therefore, understanding and 
appreciating the strategic context and OE are essential to success. 
 
 d.  Military and Nonmilitary Contributions.  Although COIN may emphasize 
military actions in some phases, nonmilitary contributions are essential for COIN to be 
successful in the long term.  COIN military efforts focused on destroying the military 
wing of insurgencies are counterguerrilla operations.  In addition to its military 
contribution, the joint force may initially be responsible for and heavily involved in 
diplomatic, informational, and economic aspects until civil agencies construct, install, or 
build HN capability and capacity to provide governance.  These military efforts will be 
coordinated and incorporated with other civil agencies at the first opportunity. 
 
 e.  Civilian agencies should lead COIN efforts.  Unified action that includes all 
HN, US, and multinational agenci s is essential for COIN.  This can be challenging due 
to the wide array of potential actors in COIN, regardless of who leads the overall effort.  
Whenever possible, civilian agencies should lead COIN efforts.  Military participation in 
COIN is focused on establishing security, assistance in security sector reform, and 
supporting other stability operations as required.  Although JFCs should be prepared to 
lead COIN efforts if required, the JFC must normally focus military operations as part of 
a comprehensive solution under civilian agency leadership. 
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almost entirely on insurgents.231 Thus, where the US doctrine is promoting a holistic 
analysis of the operational environment with emphasis on social-cultural and civil 
factors, the ‘end-product’ of the intelligence process is ‘Insurgent Courses of Action’?  
 
In conclusion, this leading COIN-document reflects the importance and relevance of 
population-centric information. However, it is less useful as a tool for the process in 
providing the policy and decision-makers with relevant intelligence. 
 
Personal skills 
 Most Dutch policy and decision-makers are educated and trained in the context of 
‘industrial wars’. As a result, some Dutch actors have problems understanding the 
consequences of their role in ‘wars amongst the people’. Problems with understanding 
and accepting that the objective of the military efforts is ‘limited’ to establishing a 
condition in which the overall objective can be achieved by diplomacy and development 
efforts. In other words, understand and accept that the PRT is the main effort of the 
TFU. However, in reality security operations are often leading before the PRT-
activities.232 The main cause can be found in the extreme complex dynamics of the 
operational environment. As a consequence, the decision-makers often do not recognize 
actionable intelligence about the root causes, local conflicts, and spoiler networks. This 
is not only a matter of not recognizing it, but also of ignoring it. Ignoring because in 
some occasions the decision-makers recognize that the intelligence is relevant, but they 
do not have the skills to translate the intelligence into actions.233 The effects of both ‘not 
recognizing’ and ‘ignoring’ are the same - a focus on less relevant intelligence. This 
focus on less relevant intelligence will result in the achievement of short-term successes 
– building schools, placing water pumps, and disrupting the Taliban. To what extent this 
process of ‘not recognizing’ and ignoring’ will take place, depends mainly on the 
personal capabilities of the key decision-makers in combination with the intelligence 
officers. To what extent is a commander able to recognize and deal with relevant 
intelligence, and to what extent is the intelligence officer able to explain and convince 
his commander.  
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Risk-management 
As stated, the Dutch policy-makers realized that the political and popular support for the 
mission was weak.234 This weak support base in combination with the uncertainty about 
the outcomes from own actions makes policy-makers more concerned about the 
management of short-term risks, than dealing with long-term threats.235 Not dealing with 
the root causes anymore, but focusing on short-term successes. Consequently, the 
mission is managed on output indicators such as the number of people that has access to 
education and medical care, the number of trained police officers and army soldiers, and 
the relative security in the districts.236 
 
Hence, ‘risk-management’ and the process of ‘not recognizing’ and ‘ignoring’ can have 
the same effect on the intelligence process. Based on risk-management The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence will have intelligence requirements that 
address the short-term issues, and based on ‘not recognizing’ and ‘ignoring’ the TFU 
will have the same requirements. It is important to be aware that these effects are not 
absolute. Depending on the political climate, the personalities of the key policy and 
decision-makers, and the situation in Uruzgan these effects will be present in a greater or 
lesser degree. 
 
Adapting competition 
The ability to learn and adapt to the environment is considered as one of the most crucial 
elements in COIN. As McChrystal stated, “Communicate and share ideas. Challenge the 
conventional wisdom if it no longer fits the environment. This is a battle of wits – learn 
and adapt more quickly than the insurgent.”237  
 
A prerequisite for the ability to adapt is basically that you are able to identify what 
works and what does not work. As David Kilcullen explained, ‘measuring progress’ is 
the best way to assess whether a campaign is on track – is successful - or not.  He also 
pointed out that this process is rather complicated if the main objective is winning the 
will of the people.238 Measuring progress is a complicated process. However, factors 	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such as ‘cascading effects’, consequences of a ‘wicked problem’, and ‘swing-voters’ 
behaviour makes figuring out what caused this progress (or deterioration) even more 
problematic. 
 
Case study 
In 2008 Team Afghanistan performed an analysis with the intention to become better in 
this process. The analysis was based on the events in the ADZ Deh Rawod in late 2007. 
In this period the Taliban took in fact control over the ADZ. The Taliban were able to 
deny physical access to the northern part of the ADZ to both ISAF and non-Taliban local 
nationals. They isolated Camp Hadrian, and had physical and psychological control over 
the larger part of the population. With the operation ‘Patan Ghar’ in January 2008, ISAF 
was able to regain the control over the ADZ. 239   
 
What was alarming for Team Afghanistan was that they were not able to forecast these 
Taliban efforts in an earlier stage. The moment that Team Afghanistan became aware of 
the Taliban intentions, it was already too late for the TFU to take preventive measures. 
The aim of the case study Deh Rawod was twofold. The first aim was to identify 
significant events in relation to Taliban and their insurgency effort in Deh Rawod. The 
second aim was to evaluate the NL-DISS ability to identify these events ahead of time 
and the team’s ability to assess these events. The case study was based on a 
chronological analysis of the Taliban main events versus the TFU main events. The 
main results of the case study were a better understanding of the Taliban modus 
operandi, vulnerabilities and strengths, and a better understanding of the local dynamics 
(figure 4.1). Based on these findings, the Team was able to develop a set of indicators, 
which allows them to detect deeper trends in the environment that may not be directly 
observable.240 In other words, improve Team’s environmental ‘awareness level’ (figure 
5.3). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  239	  Confidential	  interviews	  by	  the	  author,	  26	  March	  2010,	  29	  March	  2010.	  240	  Confidential	  interviews	  by	  the	  author,	  26	  March	  2010,	  29	  March	  2010.	  
	  	  
71	  
Figure 5.3 Team Afghanistan awareness level 
 
 
 
Collective intelligence 
Christopher Coker is pointing out that because of the social complexity, solving a 
wicked problem such as Afghanistan is fundamentally a social process. “It is a 
socialization process involving collective learning through shared experiences”.241 The 
problem is that the neither ISAF nor NL-DISS is aware enough of this. 
 
Within Team Afghanistan, the development of a thorough understanding of the conflict, 
the environment, and the insurgency has not been an optimized social process. The team 
did assimilate and used intelligence provided by foreign intelligence agencies in their 
analyses. However, most likely based on an excessive focus on secrecy, the analysts of 
Team Afghanistan did not have the authority to exchange information with alternative 
sources of knowledge such as academic and private sector experts.242 Another reason 
could be the notion that this open-source information is of inferior quality. This despite 
the fact that ninety percent of intelligence comes today from open sources, and that as a 
consequence these external experts can provide very relevant information.243 With this 
approach the NL-DISS under-utilized the potential of external subject matter experts, 
and as consequence did not optimize team’s learning process. 	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The multinational character of the operation in combination with Afghanistan being a 
‘wicked problem’ is slowing down ISAF’s learning process. The contributing nations do 
not agree on a definition of the problem. Consequently there is for example no 
agreement whether negotiation with the Taliban, and poppy-eradication is a good idea or 
not. None of these views are necessarily wrong. However, because of the disagreement 
between the nations there is no clear ISAF strategy towards these issues, and as a result 
hinder potential solutions. ISAF does not recognize the opportunities the local character 
of the conflict has to offer for the learning process. For instance, the local character 
could be exploited by conducting an ‘experiment’ in Uruzgan on the issue of negotiation 
with the Taliban.244 The lessons learned from such an experiment could be beneficial for 
all actors. In spite of this, such national initiatives are often hampered by international 
sensitivities. 
 
Production stress and deconfliction 
A brief discussion on the ‘production pressure’ of Team Afghanistan and the 
‘deconfliction’ of intelligence responsibilities concludes this chapter. 
 
The production of intelligence by Team Afghanistan is a mainly output driven process. 
The management of the analysis and production division sets goals for the quantity of 
reports to be produced by the team. In practice this means reports about actual issues on 
a daily basis, security assessments Uruzgan once every second week, and more 
extensive intelligence reports about phenomena once every few weeks. The demands 
about the quantity and subjects of these reports are more or less fixed for a whole year 
and are mainly based on a feedback between NL-DISS and the major customer, the 
Ministry of Defense. On an irregular base there are requirements for additional specific 
intelligence reports. A majority of the team members experiences this output driven 
process as extremely stressful.245 
 
The complexity of the Afghan environment in combination with the responsibilities as a 
lead nation in the Uruzgan province was a great challenge for the NL-DISS. It was for 
the first time in the history of the NL-DISS that it played such a central role in the 	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intelligence support of not only the strategic but also the operational level. One of the 
identified bottlenecks is that the division of intelligence responsibilities between NL-
DISS and the operational intelligence assets was not always clear. Measures to 
deconflict the intelligence efforts were for the most part initiated on ad hoc basis. A 
deficient conceptual framework on this issue caused a certain degree of friction and 
misunderstanding between the NL-DISS and the TFU.246 
 
Summary 
The most relevant identified bottlenecks can be summarised as follows: 
• The culture of secrecy and the disregarding of the indirect consumers led to 
restricted releasability of intelligence reports, and as a result a significant under-
utilization of NL-DISS intelligence. 
• A mixture of psychological biases caused that policy and decision-makers did not 
always accept the NL-DISS assessments, and as result did not make best use of the 
available intelligence reports.  
• A combination of shortfalls in the used models, the limitations of decision-makers, 
and risk management by the policymakers caused too much emphasis on short-term 
risks and results, and not enough emphasis on long-term threats – the root causes of 
the conflict. 
• There was not taken enough advantage of the opportunities to improve the learning 
process. The potential benefits of the evaluation of own actions and intelligence 
efforts, and the exchange of knowledge with external subject matter experts were 
not exploited. 
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6 Potential solutions 
 
After having identified the most significant pitfalls and biases, the next topic is to 
identify and discus potential solutions. These potential solutions will be discussed in the 
shape of more theoretical concepts and ideas, and not as ready to use practical solutions. 
The aim is provide the Dutch intelligence community with considerations about how to 
make intelligence more relevant.  
 
Openness when possible, secrecy when needed 
The most obvious potential solution concerns the classification of intelligence reports. 
The basic approach should be for each report to be kept to the lowest classification level 
possible. The issues and aspects to be kept confidential should in each case be carefully 
considered. The aim is to find the right balance between the risks of disclosure and the 
need for usability. The following is a first thought about such a balance.  
Intelligence about short-term security issues will inevitably incorporate large 
amounts of classified data. All customers for whom this intelligence is essential within 
their decision-making process will always have sufficient access to these reports. Hence, 
there is no need for declassification.  
A highly relevant product for most customers is a comprehensive description of 
the districts, province, and region. These reports have to be periodically updated, 
reviewing the changes in the overall situation. Also these reports will inevitably 
incorporate classified data. However, unclassified versions of each report could be made 
available.247 
Besides these geographically based reports, descriptions of certain phenomena 
are important to understand the operational environment. The releasability of these 
reports should in each case be considered. For example reports about the strategy and 
modus operandi of the Taliban – the state of the insurgency – could be released without 
any restriction. However, unclassified versions of reports with detailed information 
about the Taliban- and other spoiler-networks will not be possible or necessary.248 
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A prerequisite for this ‘new’ approach is that the intelligence community, and especially 
the NL-DISS - has to be convinced that the releasability of reports will improve the 
relevance of intelligence. To make this happen, this is not only a matter of rational 
arguments, but also a matter of emotions: the culture with an emphasis on secrecy has to 
change. Both McCrystal and Flynn demonstrate that they understand the benefits of 
unclassified reports. McCrystal’s ‘Initial Assessment’ and ‘Counterinsurgency 
Guidance’, and Flynn’s ‘Fixing Intel’ have shown to be extremely relevant for policy 
and decision-makers as well as intelligence professionals, in Afghanistan and in the US 
and Europe.249 It is not without a well thought reason that these documents are 
unclassified.      
 
Gates plus 
The second potential solution relates to the discussion about the closeness of the 
relationship between the analysts and the policy and decision-makers should be – the 
‘Kent’ versus the ‘Gates’ models. The essence of this discussion is that where relevance 
requires a close relationship between producer and consumer (Gates), objectivity 
demands a certain distance (Kent). The Gates model advocates a close relationship 
between producers and consumers through the development of a two-way flow of 
information and feedback.250 To make intelligence relevant, the producers must be 
sensitive to the context of the policy or action context.251  
 
The Dutch situation can be considered to be in accordance with the Gates model. 
Analysts have relative easy access to policy and decision-makers and are in principle 
able to identify their needs. The result of this close interaction means that in most cases 
the produced intelligence is relevant for policy and decision-making. Nevertheless, this 
‘ideal’ situation can not avoid for policy and decision-makers in some occasions to 
ignore the available intelligence, and to put too much emphasis on intelligence about 
short-term risks and results.  
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A potential solution could be an even more pro-active role for the intelligence producers 
– a ‘Gates plus’ model. Not only actively seeking for the consumer’s needs, but also 
actively convincing the consumers about the relevance of the intelligence. The necessity 
for such a pro-active model is that in complex conflicts like Afghanistan there is an 
increasing knowledge gap between the decision-makers and the intelligence 
specialists.252 This knowledge gap has two causes. Firstly, a thorough understanding of 
the dynamic complex environment requires a considerable investment in time. 
Intelligence specialists are investing in this understanding on a daily basis and for a 
longer period of time – it is the essence of their job. On the contrary, decision-makers 
have to deal with a lot of other issues as well, and are only focused on the environment 
for the duration that they are involved in the operation. Secondly, the complex 
environment cannot be simplified. You need to understand the ‘nitty-gritty’ details of the 
social relationships, economic and other disputes, and power brokers of the local 
communities.253 
In this more pro-active role the intelligence specialists should actively address the 
strengths and weaknesses of the different perspectives, and they should clarify the 
evidence and reasoning behind the assessments. The acceptance and recognition of 
relevant intelligence will improve if the intelligence specialists meet the policy and-
decision-makers on a regular basis to exchange views and explore new ideas.254 On 
several occasions a physical presentation can be more persuasive and efficient than a 
written report.  
 
A danger of this pro-active model is that the intelligence producers become too involved 
in the decision-making process. This may lead to a situation where producers will 
develop a stake in decisions, ignore facts and dangers that stand in contradiction to these 
decisions in the same way as the policy and decision-makers themselves.255 But, as 
Richard Betts pointed out, this danger of losing objectivity is a fact of intelligence 
producer’s life anyway, which has to be dealt with in the most effective way.256 In the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  252	  Confidential	  interviews	  by	  the	  author,	  29	  March	  2010.	  253	  Interview	  with	  Wilfred	  Rietdijk	  by	  the	  author,	  22	  March	  2010.	  254	  Robert	  Gates,	  ¨Guarding	  Against	  Politicization¨.	  CIA/SII,	  1992,	  Vol	  36	  No	  5,	  p.7.	  255	  As	  described	  in	  §	  2.3:	  The	  discussion	  about	  decision-­‐making	  and	  ‘bounded	  rationality’.	  256	  Betts,	  2003,	  p.	  71.	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literature on intelligence enough concepts and ideas can be found about how objectivity 
can be safeguarded.257 
 
Henry Kissinger stated that he did not know what intelligence he needed but recognized 
it when he saw it.258 In complex conflicts the policy and decision-makers frequently do 
not only know what intelligence they need, but also do not recognize it when they see it. 
For this reason, the producers should not only actively seek for the consumer’s needs, 
but also actively convince the consumers of the relevance of the intelligence. 
 
Improve the models 
Many of the used concepts and procedures are not optimized for the utilization in 
complex conflicts. To come up with ‘new’ models is beyond the scope and possibilities 
of this study. Nevertheless, it is possible to discuss a few thoughts on this issue. 
 
The concept of approaching the population, based on their attitude towards the 
government is not suited for complex conflicts (figure 5.2). The consequence of this 
model is that spoilers are positioned on the ‘right’ side. Promoting them instead of 
marginalizing them will do more harm than good to the achievement of gaining the 
support of the people. More suited than this one-dimensional model would for example 
be a two-dimensional based on attitude towards the government and attitude towards 
solving conflicts. Such a model would provide a better framework for how to approach 
the population in addressing the root causes of the conflict (figure 6.1).  
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  For	  example	  ‘competitive	  analysis’,	  ‘devils	  advocate’	  or	  formulating	  the	  essential	  assumptions	  as	  hypothesis;	   For	  more	   see	  Michael	   Handel,	   “Intelligence	   and	   the	   problem	   of	   Strategic	   Surprise”,	   in	  Betts,	  2003,	  p.	  42-­‐46.	  258	  Herman,	  1996,	  p.	  293.	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Figure 6.1 Spoilers versus stabilizing factors 
 
 
 
In population-centric conflicts, which require a holistic analysis of the operational 
environment with emphasize on social-cultural and civil factors, are ‘Insurgent Courses 
of Action’ less relevant. They can be supportive of security operation at the tactical 
level, but for a comprehensive approach in addressing the root causes they are of no use. 
A possible solution could be that the assessments are supported by comprehensive 
scenarios in which all actors are described (including own actions).259 An integral 
element of such scenarios are sets of indicators, which need to be developed in close 
cooperation between the decision-makers and the intelligence specialist.  
 
Less output, more outcome 
The production of intelligence within Team Afghanistan can be considered as a mainly 
output driven process, with an emphasis on analysis and production of reports. However, 
the various previous discussions showed that the quantity of reports has no or even a 
negative correlation with the relevance of intelligence.260 According to Richard Clarke 
an information overload is one of the most important causes for intelligence failures. 
Too much intelligence can cloud the fact that there is not enough relevant intelligence, 
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  Confidential	  interviews	  by	  the	  author,	  29	  March	  2010.	  260	  Herman,	  1996,	  p.	  298.	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and makes it difficult to identify relevant intelligence - ‘not able to connect the dots, 
because there were too many dots on the radar screen.’261 
 
Another consequence of this output driven process is that there is not enough focus and 
attention for other activities, which can have a positive effect on the relevance of 
intelligence. These other activities are already mentioned in the previous sections.  
- The evaluation of own actions, and the evaluation of the team’s ability to identify 
and assess events in the environment – case studies. 
- The feedback processes between the intelligence specialists and the policy and –
decision-makers – the pro-active role. 
- Optimizing team’s learning process - the exchange information with alternative 
sources of knowledge. 
- Tailoring the products to more the needs ‘all’ consumers  - unclassified versions. 
 
The conclusion of this is that NL-DISS should reconsider its priorities. The degree of 
relevance for the policy and decision-making process is depending on a right balance of, 
analysis, the production of reports, feedback with the consumers, tailoring the 
intelligence to the consumer’s needs, improving the team’s abilities, and optimizing 
team’s learning process (figure 6.2). Too much emphasis one or more elements, will 
degrade the others. 
 
Figure 6.2 Example of priority of intelligence activities 
  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  261Richard	   Clarke,	   was	   counter-­‐terrorism	   adviser	   on	   the	   National	   Security	   Council	   during	   the	  Clinton	  and	  the	  Bush	  administration,	  and	  is	  the	  author	  of	  Against	  all	  Enemies.	  He	  explained	  this	  at	  the	  Professional	  Advanced	  Intelligence	  Course	  at	  FHS,	  Oslo,	  8	  October	  2009.	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7 Conclusions 
 
 
The shift from ‘industrial wars’ to the contemporary paradigm of ‘war amongst the 
people’ has had enormous consequences for the theory, concepts and ideas about how 
contemporary wars (complex conflicts) are waged. What is the impact of this paradigm 
shift on the role and influence of intelligence? How relevant are intelligence reports for 
the policy and decision-making processes concerning these complex conflicts? To 
answer these questions the following research questions was formulated: 
 
From a Dutch perspective concerning complex conflicts,  
what makes intelligence relevant for decision-making,  
what bottlenecks can be identified, and what are potential solutions? 
 
To answer this question, this study was structured as follows. Firstly, the concepts and 
context of intelligence were discussed. The focus was on those aspects that are relevant 
to the relevance of intelligence. Secondly, the meaning of the term complex conflicts 
was discussed. ‘Complex conflicts’ was presented as an umbrella concept to describe the 
most relevant characteristics of the contemporary armed conflicts. The presented 
concepts of intelligence and complex conflicts formed a conceptual framework for the 
further analysis of the study. In addition, to gain more insight in relationships concerning 
the relevance of intelligence, four hypotheses were developed. Thirdly, the case (the 
Dutch perspective) was presented. It described the context, strategy, intelligence 
support, and achievements and challenges of the Dutch operation in the Uruzgan 
province. The final part of the study dealt with the identification and discussion of the 
most significant bottlenecks and possible solutions. These bottlenecks and solutions 
were identified and analyzed within the context of the presented case and within the 
provided framework of intelligence and complex conflicts.  
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7.1 Relevance for decision-making 
The answer of the first part of the central research question – what makes intelligence 
relevant for decision-making – is based on the provided conceptual framework of 
intelligence and complex conflicts, complemented with conclusions from the case study. 
  
Intelligence was defined as information collected, processed, and/or analyzed on behalf 
of actors or decision-makers. Relevance relates to the purposefulness of intelligence –the 
purpose of intelligence is not linked simply to knowledge for its own sake but to 
organized and analyzed information that can be put to use. Relevance can be measured 
by the consumer’s possibility ‘and’ ability to assimilate and use the product in their 
decision-making processes. In other words, if intelligence could have led to better 
decisions the intelligence is relevant. However, if the decision-makers do not make best 
use of the provided intelligence, it is of less relevance for decision-making. For this 
reason convincing the decision-makers to make best use of the provided intelligence, 
and tailoring intelligence to the decision-makers needs both essential aspects of the 
intelligence process. Based on this analysis on what is meant by ‘relevant for decision-
making’ the factors that influence the relevance were identified. 
 
Issues at stake  
Intelligence should address the issues at stake otherwise it is not relevant for decision-
making. But what are the issues in complex conflicts, and how are they identified?  
The identification of what intelligence is needed – the intelligence requirements - 
is a two-way and not unidirectional process. However, because of the extreme complex 
dynamics of the operational environment, the decision-maker’s requirements are often 
incomplete or unreliable: they simply do not know what they should ask. Hence, rather 
than simply responding to the decision-makers requirements, the producers should 
actively seek for their needs.  
Complex conflicts are about winning the will of the people. Consequently, 
intelligence about an adversary’s intentions and capabilities is only a small part of the 
puzzle. For intelligence to be relevant a holistic analysis of the operational environment 
with emphasis on social-cultural and civil factors is required. Intelligence should not 
only address the short-term risks, but also the long-term threats – the root causes, local 
conflicts, and spoiler networks. 
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Recognition  
If the intelligence addresses the issues at stake, but the decision-makers do not recognize 
it, it will be of no relevance for decision-making. The extreme complex dynamics of the 
operational environment will not only have an effect on the decision-maker’s ability to 
identify his own needs, but also on his ability to recognize actionable intelligence about 
the long-term threats. For this reason, the producers should not only actively seeking for 
the decision-maker’s needs, but also actively elucidating them the relevance of the 
intelligence. 
 
Acceptance 
If the decision-makers recognize the relevance of intelligence, but they ignore it, it will 
also be of less relevance for decision-making. Decision-makers may have a different 
perspective of an issue, or the intelligence may be undermining their policy or decisions. 
In this situation the danger exists that they disregard relevant intelligence – cognitive 
dissonance. Hence, the producers should also actively convince the decision-makers 
about the relevance of the intelligence. 
 
Accessibility 
Intelligence should always be available to those who need it or it will be of no relevance 
at all. The most dominant factor that influences the accessibility of intelligence is the 
classification of reports. Releasing reports will improve the usability for policy and 
decision-making. An aspect that in complex conflicts, with its large number of indirect 
and less obvious consumers, is even more relevant. Tailoring intelligence to the 
consumer’s needs can also mean keep it to the lowest classification level possible. 
 
7.2 Bottlenecks 
The second part of the central research question - what bottlenecks can be identified – 
relates completely to the discussions in chapter 5 (bottlenecks). The conclusions of this 
chapter were: 
1. The culture of secrecy and the disregarding of the indirect consumers led to a too 
high classification of intelligence reports, and as a result a significant under-
utilization of NL-DISS intelligence. 
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2. A mixture of psychological biases caused for policy and decision-makers to not 
always accept the NL-DISS assessments, and as result not to make best use of the 
available intelligence reports.  
3. A combination of shortfalls in the used models, the limitations of decision-makers, 
and risk management by the policymakers caused too much emphasis on short-term 
risks and results, and not enough emphasis on long-term threats – the root causes of 
the conflict. 
4. There was not taken enough advantage of the opportunities to improve the learning 
process. The potential benefits of the evaluation of own actions and intelligence 
efforts, and the exchange of knowledge with external subject matter experts were 
not exploited. 
 
If these bottlenecks are related to the factors that influence the relevance, the following 
conclusions can be drawn: 
- The classification had a negative effect on the accessibility of intelligence for a part 
of the consumers.  
- The psychological biases had a negative effect on the acceptance of certain 
intelligence. 
- Too much emphasis on short-term risks and results had a negative effect on both the 
acceptance and recognition of intelligence concerning the root causes of the conflict. 
- The non-optimal learning process had a negative effect on the ability to identify the 
issues at stake 
 
Table 7.1 Relationship factors – bottlenecks - causes 
 
Factors of 
influence 
Bottlenecks Causes 
Issues at stake 
 
Non-optimal learning 
process 
- -no best use of evaluation  
- -no best use of exchange of knowledge 
Recognition 
 
Focus on short-term risks - -shortfalls in the used models 
- -decision-maker’s limitations 
- -risk management 
Acceptance Psychological biases 
Focus on short-term risks 
- -cognitive disclosure 
- -confirmation bias 
- -discourse failure 
- -decision-maker’s limitations 
- -risk management 
Accessibility 
 
Inappropriate 
classification 
- -culture of secrecy 
- -disregarding indirect consumers  
	  	  
84	  
 
To identify more precisely the factors that are of influence to the relevancy of 
intelligence, four hypotheses were developed throughout the first two chapters of this 
study. These hypotheses were focused issues of which there was insufficient information 
in the literature, or of which there were dissimilar opinions.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: If intelligence does include the assessment of own policy choices or 
decisions, the relevance will increase because of the significant effects of own actions on 
the operational environment. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: If intelligence reports are publicly shared, their relevance will 
increase because more stakeholders can use it in their policy and decision-making 
process, and it will improve the exchange of information. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3: If intelligence is focussed on the opponent’s intentions and 
capabilities, this will influence the relevance of intelligence in a negative way. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 4: If the intelligence producers are close to the policy and decision-
makers, this will influence the relevance of intelligence in a positive way.   
 
The findings and conclusions of this study seem to support hypotheses 1, 3 and 4. 
Hypothesis 2 is only supported for an element of the intelligence reports. Intelligence 
about short-term security issues will inevitably incorporate large amounts of classified 
data. All customers for whom this intelligence is essential within their decision-making 
process will always have sufficient access to these reports. Hence, there is no need for 
declassification. However, because this study is based on a single case study, the 
assessments can be no more than an indication for the relationships concerning the 
relevance of intelligence.     
 
7.3 Recommendations 
In this section, recommendations are made regarding how to make intelligence more 
relevant for decision-making. This links with the third part of the central research 
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question - what are potential solutions. These potential solutions were discussed in 
chapter 6. 
 
Openness when possible, secrecy when needed 
To improve the accessibility NL-DISS should have the policy that each report will be 
kept to the lowest classification level possible. The issues and aspects to be kept 
confidential should in each case be carefully considered. The aim is to find the right 
balance between the risks of disclosure and the need for usability. To make this change 
of policy possible the intelligence community has to be convinced that the releasability 
of will improve the relevance of intelligence reports. To make this happen is not only a 
matter of rational arguments, but also a matter of emotions – the culture with an 
emphasis on secrecy has to change.  
 
Gates plus 
A potential solution to improve the recognition and acceptance of relevant intelligence is 
a quite pro-active role for the intelligence producers – a ‘Gates plus’ model. Not only 
actively seeking for the consumer’s needs, but also actively elucidating and convincing 
the consumers about the relevance of the intelligence. In this more pro-active role the 
intelligence specialists should actively address the strengths and weaknesses of the 
different perspectives, and they should clarify the evidence and reasoning behind the 
assessments. The acceptance and recognition of relevant intelligence will improve if the 
intelligence specialists meet the policy and-decision-makers on a regular basis to 
exchange views and explore new ideas  
 
Improve the models 
Certain models have to be optimized for the utilization in complex conflicts. Analytical 
tools are required for the assessment of the root causes, local disputes, spoiler-networks 
and stabilizing factors. The ‘end-product’ of the intelligence process could be 
assessments supported by comprehensive scenarios in which all actors are described 
(including own actions). 
 
Less output, more outcome 
The priorities within NL-DISS should be reconsidered. The degree of relevance for the 
policy and decision-making process is dependent on a right balance of analysis, the 
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production of reports, feedback with the consumers, tailoring the intelligence to the 
consumer’s needs, improving the team’s abilities, and optimizing team’s learning 
process (figure 6.2). Too much emphasis on certain elements will degrade the others. 
 
These potential solutions will have various positive effects on the identified bottlenecks 
and thus on the factors that influence the relevance.  
- A more pro-active role of the producers will reduce the risks of psychological biases 
and too much focus on short-term risks and results.  
- Less emphasis on secrecy will have positive effects on the learning process and will 
lead to a more appropriate classification.  
- Improved models will reduce too much focus on short-term risks.  
- Less emphasis on output related activities and more on outcome related activities 
will have a positive effect on the learning process, the psychological biases, and the 
focus on short-term risks and results. 
 
The identified factors of influence, bottlenecks, and potential solutions lead to the 
following general conclusions about how to make intelligence more relevant for policy 
and decision-making: 
• The secrecy-dominated culture within the Dutch intelligence community has to 
change. 
• The NL-DISS has to realize that producing relevant intelligence is more than an 
output focused process – it is more than analysing and the writing of reports. 
• A conceptual framework has to be developed in which the ‘new’ strategic ‘and’ 
operational role of the NL-DISS concerning complex conflicts is embedded. 
 
7.4 Discussions 
To conclude some comments are made to set this study within the larger context of 
developing intelligence as a discipline. As stated in the introduction, this study is only 
one step in the process of making intelligence more relevant for policy and decision-
making.  
Concerning the findings of this study, four additional comments need to be 
made. The first concerns the adapting competition. Solving a wicked problem such as 
Afghanistan requires a social process involving collective learning through shared 
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experiences – collective intelligence.262 The impact of this on intelligence concepts is 
only briefly discussed in this study.  
The second concerns the need for less secrecy. What are the consequences for 
the NL-DISS? Is the current organization suited to this need, or should the NL-DISS be 
divided into two; one part dealing with secret intelligence, the other with open sources? 
The third comment is concerning the fact that this study is conducted from the 
perspective of the intelligence producers. Because of the identified need for a close 
relationship between the intelligence producers and the policy and decision-makers, a 
study conducted from the perspective of the latter is desirable to get a more complete 
picture about how to make intelligence more relevant. 
The last comment is about the impact of the identified needs for less secrecy, a 
more pro-active role for the producers, and collective intelligence on the entire 
intelligence process. The distinction between the sequence and separation of activities is 
more and more fading. Therefore the question arises, is the intelligence cycle still suited 
as the dominant model for the understanding of intelligence, or should the cycle be 
disposed because it limits the process of making intelligence more relevant for policy 
and decision-making? All four issues may be object of future research. 
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  "Collective	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  in	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